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STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
REVISITED©
By DENIS W. BoIN*
This article examines the relationship between two
concepts found throughout the law of products liability,
defect and negligence. Traditional tort doctrine
contends that, although they are sometimes used
interchangeably, both concepts refer to quite distinct
matters: the state of a product, on the one hand, and
the nature of a manufacturer's conductin supplying its
products, on the other. The hallmark distinction
between a standard of fault and one of strict liability, it
is said, is that only the former requires proof of
unreasonable care, whereas both require proof of a
defect. Relying on developments in the United States
and in Canada, the author suggests that such claims are
overly sweeping in practice. In both jurisdictions, while
a decisionmaker can focus exclusively on an outcome
(the defendant's product) and ignore the reasons given
for this result (the defendant's conduct) in determining
whether or not a manufacturing defect is present,
negligence concepts such as cost-benefit balancing and
foreseeability of risk appear inseparable from inquiries
into the defectiveness of a design or warning.
Regardless of the standard of liability adopted in
theory, defect and negligence thus converge in two
important areas of products liability. The author
reviews policy considerations and two recent appellate
court decisions supporting a standard of strict liability
tailored to manufacturing defects. In his view, aprina
fade case for manufacturer liability should exist when a
plaintiff demonstrates (1) that a product is dangerously
different from its intended design, (2) that the
defendant is responsible for the defective product's
supply, and (3) that recognized damages were caused
by this defect. Pursuant to their power and their duty
to ensure the incremental evolution of the common
law, it is argued, Canadian courts ought to openly
recognize a standard of strict tort liability for
manufacturing defects.
Cet article porte sur le rapport entre deux concepts
clefs du droit de la responsabilit6 d6lictuelle du
fabricant, levice et la n6gligence. La th6orie pr6tend
que le vice traite de l'6tat d'un produit, tandis que la
nrgligence traite du comportement d'un fabricant
relativement A la fourniture de ses produits. De plus, Ia
distinction entre Ia responsabilit6 stricte et un r6gime
de responsabilit6 bas6 sur la faute est que seul le
second exige la preuve d'une conduite d6raisonnable,
maie si les deux exigent la preuve d'un vice. Utilisant
des drveloppements aux ttats-Unis et au Canada,
l'auteur de cet article pretend que ces 6nonces sont
trop gdn6raux en pratique. Dans les deux juridictions,
mame si un tribunal peut examiner exclusivement un
r6sultat (le produit de la partie d6fenderesse) atin de
dterminer si un vice de fabrication existe ou non, sans
tenir compte des raisons derrieres ce r6sultat, des
concepts clefs du droit de la n~gligence tels Ia
pr6visibilit6 et '6quilibre des cofits et des brndfices
sont au coeur d'une analyse portant sur la defectuosit6
d'un plan ou d'une mise en garde. Ainsi pou importe le
critare de responsabilit6 adopt6 en th6orie, Ie vie et la
negligence convergent dans deux domaines importants
du droit de la responsabilit6 dlietuelle du fabricant.
L'auteur passe en revue des considerations de principe
et deux d~cisions rdcentes rendues en appel qui
appuient un critre de responsabilit6 stricte propre aux
vices de fabrication. Selon lui, une cause d'action
contre un fabricant devrait atre recevable lorsque Ia
partie demanderesse d6montre 1) qu'un produit diffare
de fagon dangereuse de ses plans, 2) que la partie
defenderesse est responsable pour la fourniture du
produit dfectueux, et 3) qu'un prejudice reconnu par
lo droit fut cas6 par ce vice. Suivant leur pouvoir et
leur devoir de veiller l'evolution progressive de la
common law, les tribunaux canadiens devraient, sclon
l'auteur, reconnaitre ouvertement un crit6re de
responsabilit6 drlictuelle stricte pour les vices de
fabrication.
© 1996, D.W. Boivin.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Ottawa.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Few would argue that a manufacturer who supplies a non-
defective product should, absent some form of misrepresentation, be
responsible in tort for damages somehow flowing from the product's use.
Even in those jurisdictions in the United States which officially adhere to
strict products liability, proof of defect is (and is likely to remain) an
essential condition of recovery. 1 However, assume that the product
supplied is indeed defective. For instance, a snail is found in an opaque
bottle of ginger beer, a riding lawnmower's battery has uncovered
terminals in very close proximity to the mower's gas reservoir, or a highly
volatile and flammable floor sealer contains no warning with respect to
the serious danger of using the product near a furnace pilot light.2
Assume also that a consumer has suffered personal injury or damage to
property as a result of this defect. Should the manufacturer in these
circumstances be held liable irrespective of any negligence on its part for
the portion of damages not attributable to the consumer's own fault?
Stated somewhat differently, should a lack of reasonable care in
supplying the defective product also be essential to a finding of liability
in tort?
1 For a description of a system of manufacturer liability without defect and a convincing
explanation of why such a system is neither workable nor desirable, see J.A. Henderson & A.D.
Twerski, "Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without
Defect" (1991) 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1263.
2 As is readily apparent, these examples are taken, respectively, from Donoghue v. Stevenson,
[1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) [hereinafter Donoghue]; Nicholson v. John Deere Ltd. (1986), 58 O.R. (2d) 53
(H.C.) [hereinafter Nicholson], affd (1989), 68 O.R. (2d) 191 (C.A.); and Lambert v. Lastoplex
Chemicals Co., [1972] S.C.R. 569 [hereinafter Lambert].
[VOL. 33 NO. 3
1995] Strict Products Liability Revisited 489
The place of negligence in Canadian law of products liability is
not a novel issue in academic circles. These and comparable questions
have been posed since at least the mid-1960s and our secondary
materials contain numerous contributions to the debate, most notably,
the persuasive works of Professor Waddams3 and of Linden J.4 (as he
now is) supporting no-fault liability for defective products at common
law.s Likewise, the Ontario Law Reform Commission in its 1979 Report
on Products Liability recommended the enactment of legislation,
supposedly making negligence irrelevant to liability, stating in part
"[w]here in the course of his business a person supplies a product of a
kind that it is his business to supply and the product is a defective
product which causes personal injury or damage to property, that person
is liable in damages." 6  Despite authoritative support for reform,
Canadian courts have continued without exception to base tortious
liability in negligence and, more unfortunately, they have refused to
discuss in an open and direct manner the legitimacy of an alternative
standard. Arguably, a stricter standard of care has been judicially
recognized through the years. This standard of the 1990s requires more
of the manufacturer in terms of due diligence than did the standard of
the 1960s. The standard, however, still falls short of strict liability
because some finding of unreasonable care remains essential to liability.
3 See, for example, S.M. Waddams, Products Liability, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1993)
[hereinafter Products Liability]; S.M. Waddams, "Strict Products Liability" in F.E. McArdle, ed., The
Cambridge Lectures 1987 (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 1987) 111 [hereinafter "Strict Products Liability"];
S.M. Waddams, "Products Liability in Canadian Common Law" (1977) 12 Th6mis 25; S.M.
Waddams, "Strict Liability of Suppliers of Goods" (1974) 37 Mod. L. Rev. 154; and S.M. Waddams,
"Strict liability, Warranties and the Sale of Goods" (1969) 19 U.T.L.J. 157.
4 See, for example, A.M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 5th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1993)
[hereinafter Canadian Tort Law]; A.M. Linden, "Commentary: OLRC Report on Products
Liability" (1980) 5 Can. Bus. L.J. 92 [hereinafter "Commentary"]; A.M. Linden, "Products Liability
in Canada" in A.M. Linden, ed., Studies in Canadian Tort Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1968) 216
[hereinafter "Products Liability"]; and A.M. Linden, "A Century of Tort Law in Canada; Whither
Unusual Dangers, Products Liability and Automobile Accident Compensation?" (1967) 45 Can. Bar
Rev. 831.
5 See also G. Vukelich, "Strict Products Liability 'Just(ice) Out of Reach' - A Comparative
Canadian Survey" (1975) 33 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 46. But see R.A. Stradiotto, "Products Liability in
Tort" in Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada 1973 (Toronto: De Boo, 1973) at 189;
A.R. Thompson, "Manufacturer's Liability" (1970) 8 Alta L. Rev. 305; and H.P. McLaughlin &
M.S. Shannon, "'Caveat Factor': Strict Liability and the Manufacturer" (1966) 2 U.B.C. L. Rev. 502.
6 (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1979) [hereinafter Report on Products Liability]
at 135, s. 3(1) of the Draft Bill. However, the proposed legislation defines "defective product"
simply as a "product that falls short of the standard that may reasonably be expected of it in all the
circumstances" (ibid., s. 1(1)(a)). Arguably, this definition does not render negligence irrelevant to
liability, but simply makes its use more discrete.
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The response of our legislatures has been likewise delayed; only New
Brunswick and Quebec have legislation addressing the standard of
liability in tort with respect to defective products.7 Today, there appears
to be little momentum for reforming this issue of products liability.
This article revisits strict products liability and argues in favour
of adopting such a principle under Canadian tort law. Unlike other
contributions to the debate, however, this piece addresses the
interrelation between the concepts of "defect" and "negligence" in
making its proposal. Before entering the realm of policy analysis and
attempting to answer questions of the sort posed in the opening
paragraph, one ought to examine the way in which a consumer product
may be defective. Recent developments in the United States? have
made at least one thing clear: a general principle that liability rests on
the supply of a defective product, irrespective of reasonable care, does
not necessarily translate into a pure standard of strict liability in judicial
decision making. Courts and litigants must define "defective product" in
order to apply such a principle. If the definition chosen incorporates
elements from the law of negligence, such as cost-benefit analysis and
the foreseeability of risk, the standard remains fundamentally based on
fault regardless of the label assigned to it. This, in fact, occurs when the
products in issue are defective because of faulty designs9 or inadequate
warning!0 In these areas, the line between negligence and strict liability
has become somewhat blurred in the United States. With respect to
7 See Consumer Product Warranty and LiabiliryAct, S.N.B. 1978, c. C-18.1, s. 27; and Civil Code
of Quibec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 1468 and 1469.
8 Developments in American products liability law are fully discussed in the following
symposia: "The Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Occasion for
Reform of Product Liability Law?" (1993) 10 Touro L. Rev. 1; "Tort Reform Symposium:
Perspectives on the American Law Institute's Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility for
Personal Injury" (1993) 30 San Diego L. Rev. 213; "Tort Reform" (1992) 27 Gonzaga L. Rev. 153;
and "Products Liability: Special Edition" (1991) 20 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 183. See also: C.E. Cantu,
"Twenty-five Years of Strict Product Liability Law: The Transformation and Present Meaning of
Section 402A" (1993) 25 St. Mary's LJ. 327; and J.A. Henderson & A.D. Twerski, "Stargazing: The
Future of American Products Liability" (1991) 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1332.
9 A "design defect" becomes relevant whenever the specifications chosen by a manufacturer
for a product create excessive risks of personal injury or property damage to consumers: see Part
IV, below.
10 A"warning defect" becomes relevant whenever the information given by a manufacturer, or
the manner in which it is presented, fail to adequately impart to consumers the non-obvious risks to
person and property associated with the product's use: see Part IV, below.
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manufacturing defects, 1 however, courts south of the border have had
little difficulty in implementing true strict products liability, that is, in
preventing this standard from becoming diluted through the concept of
defect. In March 1992, the American Law Institute announced its plan
to overhaul § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts12 because "it has
proven so influential in the development of modern product liability
law" and its current sweeping formulation has become "increasingly
irrelevant and unresponsive to contemporary needs."'13 One of the
issues in need of clarification, according to Henderson and Twerski, the
reporters of the Third Restatement, is the complex relationship between
defect, negligence, and strict liability as they relate to the various
theories of manufacturer responsibility: 4 In my opinion, all of this
speaks to the potential of both doctrine and policy in the reform of
products liability.
Part II of this article contains a brief review of the role played by
negligence in the development of products liability law in Canada and in
the United States.15 As will be shown, history reveals an ever-unfolding
relationship between the concept of manufacturer negligence, on the
one hand, and the manner in which courts deal with losses caused by
defective products, on the other. For our purposes, this development
began in the nineteenth century, where reasonable care played second
fiddle to privity of contract, and is currently moving towards the view
that negligence is somehow relevant when dealing with products
containing defective designs or warnings, but not when dealing with
manufacturing defects. More specifically, this development may be
described by referring to six phases, characterized chiefly by the
11 A "manufacturing defect" becomes relevant whenever a product departs in a dangerous
manner from its intended specifications, that is, when the product differs from its contemplated
design in a way that is dangerous to a consumer's person or property: see Part IV, below.
12 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2)(a) (St. Paul: American Law Institute, 1965).
13 A.D. Twerski, "From A Reporter's Perspective: A Proposed Agenda" (1993) 10 Touro L.
Rev. 5.
14 J.A. Henderson & A.D. Twerski, "Will A New Restatement Help Settle Troubled Waters:
Reflections" (1993) 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1257 at 1261-66.
15 For a detailed analysis, see Waddams, Products Liability, supra note 3 at 1-10; O.S. Gray,
"Reflections on the Historical Context of Section 402A" (1993) 10 Touro L. Rev. 75; G.L. Priest,
"The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of
Modem Tort Law" (1985) 14 J. Leg. Stud. 461; J.W. Wade, "Strict Tort Liability for Products: Past,
Present and Future" (1984) 13 Cap. U.L. Rev. 335; W.L. Prosser, "The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer)" (1966) 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791; and W.L. Prosser, "The Assault on the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)" (1960) 69 Yale L.J. 1099 [hereinafter "The Assault on
the Citadel"].
1995]
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following events: first, the outright denial of liability in the absence of
contractual privity, regardless of the presence of manufacturer
negligence; second, the creation of exceptions to the privity rule for
certain products and unsanctioned trading practices; third, the
recognition of a general duty of care owed by the manufacturer directly
to its consumers, irrespective of privity of contract, allowing an action for
damages in the case of negligence; fourth, the relaxation of the
negligence standard of liability in specified circumstances through a
number of evidential devices such as res ipsa loquitur; fifth, the open
adoption of a general alternative basis of liability, independent of
manufacturer's fault, that is, all-encompassing strict products liability;
and finally, the recognition of the limits of this new standard of liability
by the application of negligence concepts in specified circumstances.
A majority of Canadian jurisdictions are dragging behind in this
development, unwilling to openly embrace strict products liability. Our
tort law thus evolves largely within the fourth phase. This reluctance is
only partly justified. The Canadian proponents of strict tort liability,
like the reformers of the late 1960s in the United States, often fail to
recognize important distinctions in the grounds under which a product
may be defective and the relationship between these grounds and the
issue of manufacturer negligence. When these questions are addressed,
as I will attempt to do in Part III, at least one conclusion will follow: only
with respect to manufacturing defects, a limited area of products
liability, is it possible to completely detach the question of "whether this
manufacturer has exercised reasonable care" from the question of
"whether the product is defective." With respect to design defects and
failures to warn, the other two possible grounds for finding a product
defective greatly overlap by definition. The closeness of "defect" and
"negligence" in these latter areas would cause difficulties in
implementing liability without fault, as distinguished from liability
without defect, even if the benefit of such a change were conceded.
General or all-encompassing strict products liability should therefore be
avoided.
However, in Part IV I argue that, regardless of the uncertainty
currently plaguing the law of defective design and of failure to warn, it is
time for Canadian common law to recognize that proof of negligence is
unnecessary to impose liability for manufacturing defects. Of course,
there are other reasons besides a relative ease of implementation for this
recommendation. That it is possible to find a manufacturer responsible
in this area without saying (or implying) anything about the
reasonableness of its conduct does not mean it is appropriate to do so.
Part IV will thus set out the policy reasons why I believe Canadian
492 [VOL. 33 No. 3
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courts, if not legislatures, should openly adopt a standard of strict
liability tailored to manufacturing defects-a move which would
represent "an incremental change to the law, necessary to see that the
common law develops in a manner that is consistent with modem
notions of commercial reality and justice.
'16
I have selected two recent appellate court decisions, Farro v.
Nutone Electrical Ltd.1 7 and LeBlanc v. Oland Breweries Ltd.,1 8 to
illustrate the confined area of products liability where a standard of strict
tort liability ought to be openly recognized by Canadian courts. Both
cases deal with manufacturing defects, as defined herein, and both
reflect the tendency of our courts in such cases to readily equate a
finding of defect with a finding of negligence and to pay little, if any,
attention to the care employed by the manufacturer in the fabrication of
its product. For reasons given in Part V, I believe the courts of appeal
for Ontario and for New Brunswick missed golden opportunities in Farro
and LeBlanc to recognize the de facto irrelevance of negligence with
respect to manufacturing defects and, hence, to revise the increasingly
shallow language of our common law of products liability.
II. NEGLIGENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
In this part, I elaborate on each of the phases pivotal in the
development of products liability from a negligence perspective. The
first phase takes place during the high days of contract law, where now-
unquestioned notions of concurrency between contract and tort19 are
lost in concerns about opening the floodgates of litigation, slippery
slopes, and unlimited defendant liability. At the heart of the judicial
reluctance characterizing this period is the privity rule derived from the
infamous 1842 case of Winterbottom v. Wright.20 There, a unanimous
court held that a supplier of mailcoaches-who had leased a coach to the
plaintiff's employer under a contract which stipulated, inter alia, that the
supplier had the duty to keep the coach in good repair-was not liable to
1 6 London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel Int'l Ltd., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299 at 453 [hereinafter
London Drugs].
17 (1990), 72 O.R. (2d) 637 (CA.) [hereinafter Farro].
18 (1994), 142 N.B.R. (2d) 287 (C.A.) [hereinafter LeBlanc].
19 For a recent reaffirmation of concurrency, see BG Checo International Ltd. v. British
Columbia Hydro and PowerAuthority, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 12.
20 152 E.R. 402 (Ex. P1.) [hereinafter Winterbottom].
1995]
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the plaintiff driver who was injured when the coach collapsed by reason
of a defective axle. The reasons given by the court contain much
language suggesting that fear of a downpour of litigation and of exposing
defendants to unlimited liability strongly motivated the decision.21 The
facts and pleadings suggest that the ratio decidendi could have been
limited to the rule that A cannot sue B for breach of a contract between
B and C, to which A is not a party.22 The decision appears to be silent
on the proposition that B could owe a duty of care in tort to A,
independent of B's contract with C or concurrent thereto, and upon
which A could sue. 3 Notwithstanding this, Winterbottom was generally
interpreted in a wider sense, postponing the acceptance of this latter
argument. Thus, in Canada and the United States, the general rule
developed that the manufacturer of a defective product, irrespective of
its negligence, owed a duty of care only to those with whom it shared
privity of contract. With an expanding market, a greater number of
individuals came between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer
of its products, thereby breaking privity of contract and greatly limiting
the consumer's remedies.
Fortunately, this rule was not always rigidly applied. The second
phase includes situations which arose before and after Winterbottom
where, notwithstanding a lack of privity, the plaintiff was allowed to sue
the defendant in tort for damages caused by a defective product supplied
by the latter. Judicially created "exceptions" allowed a duty to arise
between a manufacturer and a distant consumer. The exceptions did
not, however, alter the nature of the duty owed. This remained a duty to
exercise reasonable care. Hence, even if an exception applied, the
plaintiff was required to prove manufacturer negligence. Undoubtedly
the most significant of these exceptions, and the one whose remnants
may still be found in some recent decisions, 2 4 is the duty of care
pertaining to so-called "inherently" dangerous chattels or goods such as
21 Ibid. at 417, Abinger L.i.; and at 418, Alderson LJ.
2 2 See F. Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1926) at 76-80; and
J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 8th ed. (Sydney: Law Book, 1992) at 481-82.
23 But see C.A. Wright, A.M. Linden & L.N. Kar, Canadian Tort Law: Cases, Notes and
Materials, 9th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1990), c. 16 at 16-8/9; and the final sentence of Abinger
L.J.'s reasons where he refers to the action as being one "of tort": Winterbottom, supra note 20 at
418.
24 See, for example, Nova Scotia (Government Services) v. Picker Canada Ltd. (1989), 92
N.S.R. (2d) 385; and Moore v. Cooper Canada Ltd (1990), 2 C.C.L.T. (2d) 57 (Ont. H.C.).
[VOL- 33 NO. 3
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poison, sulphuric acid, dynamite, and deadly weapons 25 The validity
and necessity of differentiating these products for special treatment was
often questioned,26 especially when some courts expanded the category
to include food and beverages which by nature could not be dangerous
unless defectively made or prepared (i.e., they required some externality
to make them dangerous). This differentiation was ultimately abandoned
in favour of the general rule of liability for negligence recognized in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.27 and Donoghue discussed below. Today,
the distinction should only be a reminder that the inherent nature of a
danger, though no longer itself capable of triggering a duty of care, is a
relevant factor in deciding whether a duty arises and in determining its
nature and extent.28 The other exceptions to the rule of privity derived
from Winterbottom involved mostly dishonest trading practices. These
included cases where the person supplying the goods had knowingly
made a false representation as to the safety of the product,29 where the
supplier knew of the defect and wilfully concealed it,30 and where the
supplier, although aware of a defect in the product, failed to adequately
warn the plaintiff of the defect. 31 In each of these situations, the plaintiff
was allowed to sue the manufacturer for negligence, notwithstanding the
absence of privity.
The third phase in the development of liability in tort for
defective products witnessed simultaneously the rejection of privity and
the adoption of a general rule. This general rule engulfed the earlier
exceptions to privity and allowed consumers to sue manufacturers
directly for breach of a duty of care. The leading decision in the United
States was MacPherson, where the ultimate purchaser of an automobile,
injured when a defectively manufactured wheel collapsed, was allowed to
25 For a list of cases invoking this exception, see W.T.S. Stalleybrass, "Dangerous Things and
the Non-Natural User of Land" (1929) 3 Camb. LJ. 376 at 379-81.
2 6 Hodges & Sons v. Anglo-American Oil Co. (1922), 12 floyd's Rep. 183 at 187 (C.A.); and
Chapman v. Saddler & Co., [1929] AC. 584 at 599 (H.L.), Dunedin LJ.
27 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) [hereinafter MacPherson].
2 8 See Rae v. T. Eaton Co. (1961), 45 M.P.R. 261 (N.S.S.C.); and Allard v.Manahan, [1974] 3
W.W.R. 588 at 596-97 (B.C.S.C.).
2 9 See, for example, Langridge v. Levy (1837), 150 E.R. 863 (Ex.); and Lewis v. Teny, 43 P. 398
(Cal. 1896).
3 0 See, for example, Kuelling v. Roderick Lean Mfg. Co., 75 N.E. 1098 (N.Y. 1905); and Huset v.
J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
31 See, for example, Heaven v. Pender (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 503 (C.A.); Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler
Co., 143 N.W. 48 (Mich. 1913); Nokes v. Kent Co. (1913, 4 O.W.N. 665 (H.C.); andRoss v. Dunstall
(1921), 62 S.C.R. 393 [hereinafter Ross].
1995]
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sue the manufacturer for negligence in the production process. The
principle advanced by Cardozo J. treats all manufacturer/consumer
relationships alike and eliminates the need to underscore the so-called
inherently dangerous products at the stage of determining whether a
duty is owed. His reasons are not free of difficulties, however, as he
speaks in terms of "thing[s] of danger" and requires the assessment of a
number of foreseeability factors in determining whether a dufy of care
arises. These factors include the manufacturer's "probable" knowledge
of the danger, knowledge that people other than the immediate buyer
will use the product, and the "proximity or remoteness of the relation"
between the parties.32 Under this analysis, the manufacturer's duty (if it
arises) is not absolute; it is a duty to "make [the product] carefully."33
The counterpart in Canada and in the rest of the
Commonwealth, in terms of its influence, is undoubtedly the 1932 House
of Lords decision in Donoghue.34 There, a consumer was allowed to sue
a manufacturer directly in tort, notwithstanding the absence of privity,
after allegedly finding a snail in a bottle of ginger beer, an obvious
manufacturing defect. As in MacPherson, the main issues in this case are
whether a manufacturer can owe a duty of care to a consumer
independently of contract, and, if so, in what circumstances. Atkin L.J.
held, generally, that a duty to exercise reasonable care arises between
"neighbours;" it arises in circumstances where the plaintiff is so closely
and directly affected by the defendant's act that the latter ought
reasonably to have the former in contemplation as being affected when
his or her mind is directed to the acts or omissions which are now in
question 35 Atkin L.J. had no difficulty finding that consumers were
neighbours to manufacturers. However, he proceeded to set out a
pivotal principle to determine in what circumstances a manufacturer
owes a duty to take "reasonable care." The relevant factors are: (1) the
manufacturer's intention to have its products "reach the ultimate
consumer in the form in which they left him with no reasonable
possibility of intermediate examination;" and (2) the manufacturer's
knowledge "that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or
32 Supra note 27 at 1054-55.
33 Ibid. at 1055. For instance, the defendant in MacPherson was found negligent as the defect
in the wheel could have been discovered by a reasonable inspection, which it failed to perform.
3 4 Supra note 2. But see Canadian Tort Law, supra note 4 at 548-49; Ross, supra note 31; and P.
Legrand, Jr., "En relisant Ross c.Dunstall" (1991) 22 Rev. G6n. 303.
35 Donoghue, supra note 2 at 580-81.
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putting up of the product will result in an injury to the consumer's life or
property. '3
6
By eliminating the rule of privity, these landmark decisions and
the exceptions they rendered obsolete solved one potential problem
facing a plaintiff in a products liability action. Neither of them, however,
altered the standard of liability used to judge the manufacturer's
conduct. Instead, they confirmed that a manufacturer only owed a duty
to exercise reasonable care to its consumers, and that a plaintiff was
required to prove negligence in order to succeed. Naturally, this
requirement created difficulties for the plaintiff, especially when defects
in the manufacturing stage were alleged. There, either the manufacturer
alone possessed the information required to establish lack of reasonable
care in the making of its product, or this information was nowhere to be
found. Furthermore, when the product was one of use rather than
consumption, many alternative explanations for the defect were raised in
defence, such as wear and tear, inadequate use or maintenance, or faulty
repairs.
During the fourth phase in the development of products liability,
courts in Canada and the United States struggled with these difficulties
as they began to address the ultimate issue in suits of this kind: which
party, as between an innocent consumer and a possibly negligent
manufacturer, should bear the losses caused by products containing
(manufacturing) defects? On this issue, policies such as ensuring
compensation for injured plaintiffs and protecting consumers from harm
would often tilt the balance in favour of the plaintiff. However, short of
abandoning negligence as an element of the tort, courts needed some
means to translate instinctive policy determinations into concrete
judgments. For this, many used (and in some jurisdictions still use) a
variety of evidential techniques, alone or in conjunction, such as relying
heavily on circumstantial evidence of negligence, relaxing the
requirements of the maxim of res ipsa loquitur, and using general
inferences of negligence.37
As a result of MacMillan L.J.'s obiter dictum in Donoghue,38 there
was some confusion in Canada as to whether res ipsa loquitur or other
3 6 ibid. at 599.
37 For a detailed analysis of these devices and their application to products liability, see
Fleming, supra note 22 at 485-88; Products Liability, supra note 3 at 58-62; D.W. Noel & JJ. Phillips,
Products Liability, 2d ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1982) at 745-60; and M.S. Shapo, The Law of
Products Liability, 2d ed. (Salem, N.H.: Butterworth, 1990), c. 24.
38 Supra note 2 at 622.
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evidential shortcuts could be used in a products liability actionP9 In
1936, however, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in the case
of Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, 4 0 began demystifying the
requirement of negligence and cleared the way for the use of these
devices in the absence of direct evidence. Although the Privy Council
wrote mostly in terms of negligence being inferred generally from the
proof of the defect coupled with the surrounding circumstances,41 many
subsequent courts resorted specifically to res ipsa loquitur.42 Today, the
debate about when to invoke circumstantial evidence, res ipsa loquitur, or
a general inference of negligence is largely overlooked by Canadian
courts and commentators. The choice of one evidential device over
another has not, to date, created many practical difficulties. Courts
appear to adopt an ad hoc approach where they decide, on the basis of
the available evidence of negligence and the circumstances of the case,
whether it is just to hold the manufacturer responsible for the losses
caused by its product.43 The same can be said about the debate as to
whether these devices shift the burden of proof on the defendant with
respect to negligence (i.e., the risk of non-persuasion) or merely impose
a burden of going forward with sufficient evidence to meet or rebut a
presumption of negligence. Writing about the Canadian situation,
Waddams and the Ontario Law Reform Commission observe that a
plaintiff who proves that a product is defective and has caused the
damages complained of rarely loses on the ground of failing to establish
the manufacturer's negligence. 44 These evidential shortcuts have greatly
contributed to this phenomenon, at least when manufacturing defects
are involved. 45
Similar observations may be made about the situation in the
United States prior to the adoption of strict tort liability. The majority
opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.46 shows how the maxim of res
39 See, for example, Wdlisv. Coca Cola, [1934] 47 B.C.R. 481 (C.A.).
40 [1936] A.C. 85 (P.C.) [hereinafter Grant].
41 Ibid. at 101, Wright L.J.
42 SeeArendale v. Canada Bread Ltd., [1941] O.W.N. 69 (C.A.); and Zeppa v. Coca-Cola Ltd.,
[1955] O.R. 855 (C.A.), to name but two examples.
43 For more examples, see Farro, supra note 17; and LeBlanc, supra note 18, discussed under
Part V, below.
4 4 Products Liability, supra note 3 at 58; and Report on Products Liability, supra note 6 at 17.
45 With few exceptions, devices such as res ipsa loquitur are only resorted to when
manufacturing defects are alleged.
46 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) [hereinafter Escola].
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ipsa loquitur was used to attribute the costs of products with
(manufacturing) defects to their manufacturer, without having to openly
abandon the requirement of negligence. The concurring reasons of
Traynor J. therein, 47 who would have taken this last step, also give a
preview of the imminent conceptual revolution. Evidential devices are
still used in the United States; however, their importance has somewhat
diminished since the coming of strict tort liability.
The fifth phase in the development of liability in tort for
defective products marks a break between the official approaches used in
Canada and the United States. Starting in 1963 with Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products Inc.,48 American courts began accepting the proposition
that a "manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on
the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."49 The
principal arguments for abandoning the negligence requirement are
found in Traynor J.'s concurring reasons in Escola,S° and are adopted by
the Supreme Court of California in Greenman. These reasons include
the following: (1) the manufacturer is in the best position to avoid the
risks of injury by taking preventive measures; (2) the loss may be
overwhelming for the plaintiff, but the manufacturer can procure
insurance and distribute the loss to society as a cost of doing business;
(3) regardless of negligence, the manufacturer is responsible for
products placed on the market and should bear the loss; (4) it is often
difficult for the injured person to establish negligence; (5) the trier of
fact often applies, in effect, strict liability via the use of evidential
shortcuts such as res ipsa loquitur; (6) many statutes already endorse a
strict liability rule in the case of food products; (7) the current rule
allowing the plaintiff to sue the retailer for breach of warranty51 but not
the manufacturer is needlessly circuitous and engenders wasteful
litigation; (8) in food products cases, many courts have extended the
warranty from the manufacturer to the consumer, thus allowing the
latter to sue the former directly for breach of warranty; (9) sales
warranties serve the purposes of deterrence and compensation "fitfully
at best;" and (10) greater reliance is placed by society on manufacturers
4 7 Ibi& at 440.
48 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) [hereinafter Greenman].
4 9 Ibid at 900.
50 Supra note 46 at 440-44. See also "The Assault on the Citadel," supra note 15.
51 Negligence is immaterial in such an action: "The Assault on the Citadel," ibid.; and "Strict
Liability, Warranties and the Sale of Goods," supra note 3.
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as consumers lack the means and skills to fully investigate every product,
because their vigilance is lulled by advertising and market devices.
Unlike in Escola, the facts in Greenman suggest that a defective design
was also responsible for the plaintiffs injuries. As in Escola, however,
Traynor J. did not expand on the concept of "defect" other than to
conclude by noting that a "defect in design and manufacture" is the
prerequisite to strict products liability. In 1965, the American Law
Institute made public the Restatement (Second) of Torts which espoused
in § 402A a general rule of strict liability for those who sell products "in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer" or
to his or her property. This rule does not expressly distinguish between
various types of defects when stating that it applies "although the seller
has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product,' '5 2 that is, when rejecting negligence as the appropriate
standard of liability. By "defective condition," § 402A means a
"condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him"' 53 whereas by "unreasonably
dangerous," § 402A means "dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics."' 54 Most American jurisdictions, either judicially or
legislatively, have now adopted some form of general strict liability based
in tort, along the model suggested by the American Law Institute.55
Despite this remarkable development, the "strict tort liability
'explosion' [in the United States] has not caused so much as a ripple on
our placid Canadian waters. '56 To be sure, the possibility of suing the
retailer for breach of warranty and the availability of evidential devices in
tort actions against the manufacturer go a long way towards
implementing de facto strict products liability in Canada. However, the
Canadian approach arguably still falls short in many respects when
compared to open strict tort liability. For example, a suit is not always
possible against a retailer as he or she may be insolvent, absent, or
52 Supra note 12.
53 Ibid., comment g.
54 Ibid., comment i.
55 See "State Chart-Acceptance of Strict Liability," 1 Products Liability Rep. (C.C.H.) 4016
(November 1988-April 1989). Currently, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia adopt the
Restatement's version of strict tort liability while eight states and Puerto Rico recognize variations
of § 402A. Only Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia have yet to
adopt strict tort liability.
5 6 Canadian Tort Law, supra note 4 at 576.
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beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. Furthermore, Canadian courts
have not been as willing as their counterparts in the United States to
dispense with the requirements of horizontal and vertical privity of
contract in warranty actions. Consequently, except in the three
provinces where the legislatures have intervened,5 7 the general rule in
Canada is that only a seller can be liable for breach of warranty (vertical
privity), and only to a buyer (horizontal privity). Finally, in tort actions
against manufacturers, differences exist between a standard of
negligence and one of strict liability, despite res ipsa loquitur and other
devices58 : the requirement of negligence extends the litigation process
causing delays, expenses, and disincentives to sue; the inference of
negligence suggested by the maxim arguably applies only against the
manufacturer and not the wholesaler, repairer, or retailer who have less
control of the product and its instrumentalities; the state of the art
defence may excuse a manufacturer on the ground that it took all
reasonable care based on the knowledge at the time of production; and,
where the defect is caused by a component part manufactured by
someone other than the defendant manufacturer, it is harder, although
not impossible,59 to infer negligence against the latter.
The sixth phase in the development of products liability offers
some reassurance to Canadian courts and legislatures. Indeed, the
implementation of general strict liability has faced its share of obstacles
in the United States. Thirty years of experience since Greenman and
§ 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts have demonstrated that
disregarding a standard of fault is not as simple as perhaps originally
estimated by American (and Canadian) proponents of strict products
liability. The regime in the United States has recently come under
intense scrutiny and, fuelled by various concerns related to the cost of
litigation, a growing number of commentators and courts are calling for
important reforms to the law of products liability.60 To be sure, many of
57 See Warranties on Consumer Products Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. C-30, s. 14; Consumer Product
Warranty and Liability Act, S.N.B. 1978 c. C-18.1, s. 23; and Consumer Protection Act, 1978, S.Q.
1978, c. 9, s. 53.
58 See Products Liability, supra note 3 at 61-62; and Fleming, supra note 22 at 486-88.
5 9 As shown by both Farro, supra note 17; and LeBlanc, supra note 18, discussed under Part V,
below.
60 See, for example, A. Schwartz, "The Case Against Strict Liability" (1992) 60 Fordham L.
Rev. 819; J. Cirace, "A Theory of Negligence and Products Liability" (1992) 66 St. John's L. Rev. 1;
G.L. Priest, "Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability Be Defended?" (1992) 9 Yale J. on Reg. 237; D.
Beyleveld & R. Brownsword, "Impossibility, Irrationality and Strict Product Liability" (1991) 20
Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 257; and W.C. Powers, "A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products
Liability" [1991] U. Ill. L. Rev. 639. The judiciary's changing attitude towards strict products
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these criticisms are addressed to issues neither logically nor legally tied
to the standard of liability used to judge the manufacturer's
r~sponsibility.61 However, strict liability per se has not been exempt from
this scrutiny. In particular, when interpreting "defective condition" and
"unreasonably dangerous," two key notions purposefully left vague in
§ 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, many courts and
commentators have given de facto recognition to the limitations of a
generalized standard of strict liability by incorporating into their
definitions elements more commonly associated with a negligence-based
inquiry. Interestingly, this phenomenon occurs almost exclusively when
courts are seised with products containing defects attributable to their
designs or lack of warnings. In jurisdictions officially adhering to strict
liability, a majority of courts now openly resort to some form of cost-
benefit balancing with respect to design defects62 and to foreseeability of
risk for failure to warn6 3-elements which are central to the law of
negligence. Hence, in these areas there is a valid debate as to whether a
meaningful distinction exists between a standard of strict liability and the
alternative standard based in fault.64 Stated somewhat differently, it is
liability is fully canvassed in J.A. Henderson & T. Eisenberg, "The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change" (1990) 37 U.C.L.A L. Rev. 479; and T.M. Schwartz,
"Product Liability Reform by the Judiciary" (1992) 27 Gonzaga L. Rev. 303 [hereinafter "Reform
by the Judiciary"]. Legislatures have responded in various ways to this wave of criticism: see the
useful table of tort reform legislation adopted by states in L. Lipsen, "The Evolution of Products
Liability as a Federal Policy Issue" in P.H. Schuck, ed., Tort Law and the Public Interest:
Competition, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991) 247 at 262-69; and
G. Blakmon & R. Zeckhauser, "State Tort Reform Legislation: Assessing Our Control of Risks" in
Schuck, ed., ibid. at 272.
61 They include issues such as the jury system, the assessment of damages, the availability of a
defence, limitation periods, joint and several liability, the collateral source rule, and rules
discouraging frivolous claims.
62 See J.A. Henderson & A.D. Twerski, "A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts" (1992) 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1512 at 1520 and 1532-34. See, generally,
MJ. Davis, "Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility" (1993) 39 Wayne L.
Rev. 1217.
63 See "Annotation, Strict Products Liability: Liability for Failure to Warn as Dependent on
Defendant's Knowledge of Danger" (1984) 33 A.L.R. (4th) 368 at 371; Fibreboard Corporation v.
Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168 (Colo. 1993) [hereinafter Fibreboard Corp. ]; Shanks v. The Upjohn Company,
835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992); Owens-llinois Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633 (Md. Ct. App. 1992); and
Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991) [hereinafterAnderson].
64 See G.T. Schwartz, "Foreword: ,Understanding Products Liability" (1979) 67 Cal. L. Rev.
435 at 462-63; and G.T. Schwartz, "The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability"
(1981) 15 Ga. L Rev. 963 at 972-73. With respect to design defects, see also F.J. Vandall, "'Design
Defect' in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict liability" (1982) 43 Ohio St. L.J. 61;
S.L. Birnbaum, "Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict
Liability to Negligence" (1980) 33 Vand. L. Rev. 593; and W.P. Keeton, "Products Liability-
Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect" (1979) 10 Cumb. L. Rev. 293. With respect to failure
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now open to question whether courts in the United States and Canada
are, in reality, adopting different approaches with respect to design and
warning defects and, if not, whether their common ground may be found
elsewhere than in strict liability.
Manufacturing defects, on the other hand, have presented fewer
conceptual difficulties in strict liability jurisdictions. 6s As will be argued
under Part III, below, a clear line has always divided the issues of
"negligence" and "defect" with respect to manufacturing defects, unlike
when design defects and failure to warn are involved. The concept of a
defect in the manufacture of a product is relatively simple and, by
definition, makes irrelevant any reference to the conduct or mental
process of the manufacturer or to a balancing of competing interests.
Thus, it is easy to see what is removed from the analysis when a move to
strict liability is made; in negligence, the plaintiff must prove not only a
manufacturing defect (e.g., the presence of a snail in a bottle), but also
negligence on the part of the manufacturer vis-&i-vis said defect (e.g.,
failure to take adequate preventive measures such as quality control
testing and continual monitoring of the production line). In this respect,
there are hundreds of decisions involving res ipsa loquitur which
exemplify this distinction by bridging the gap, which does exist, between
the two concepts. Accordingly, the implementation of strict liability in
this field has been relatively simple: courts sometimes struggle in
applying the definition of manufacturing defects to the facts before
them, but they rarely express difficulty in accounting for the alternative
basis of liability. Here, even though the distinction between the
approaches used by courts in the United States and Canada is also
questionable, 66 the pull is clearly in the opposite direction than with
respect to design and warning defects; that is, the move is towards the
American standard of liability where proof of manufacturer negligence is
unnecessary.
This latest phase in the development of products liability from a
negligence perspective is often ignored by Canadian proponents of strict
liability. They usually speak of this standard in very general terms, not
unlike Greenman and § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and
to warn, see also Note, "The Move Toward a Negligence Standard in Strict Products Liability
Failure to Warn Cases" (1989) 27 Duquesne L. Rev. 755; A. Gershonowitz, "The Strict Liability
Duty to Warn" (1987) 44 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 71; MJ. Bromberg, "The Mischief of the Strict
Liability Label in the Law of Warnings" (1987) 17 Seton Hall L. Rev. 526; and Note, "Is There a
Distinction Between Strict Liability and Negligence in Failure to Warn Actions" (1981) 15 Suffolk
U.L Rev. 983.
65 Twerski, supra note 13 at 9-12; and Henderson & Twerski, supra note 62 at 1515-20.
66 Because of the use by Canadian courts of res ipsa loquitur and other evidential devices.
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overlook important differences between the three recognized categories
of defects which surface when implementing strict liability. Thus, as
noted elsewhere, 67 the recommendations made tend to overly generalize
the necessity and practicality of adhering to such a theory, and fail to
take into account the more recent experience in the United States. In
my view, this phase provides the necessary impetus for revisiting the
debate on Canadian strict products liability. For reasons given under
Part III, I believe that, irrespective of the uncertainty currently plaguing
the law of defective design and of failure to warn, it is time for Canadian
courts to rejoin their American counterparts by openly recognizing that
proof of negligence is unnecessary to impose liability for manufacturing
defects. First, I review some definitions of the three main categories of
product defects.
III. DEFECTS IN MANUFACTURE, DESIGN, AND WARNING
Virtually everyone agrees that in order to give rise to liability in
tort, a manufacturer's product must have somehow been defective when
the plaintiff's personal injury or property damage occurred. There is
much debate as to what other elements must be proved, primarily as to
whether lack of reasonable care in relation to this defect is required.
However, absent some form of misrepresentation, it is undisputed that a
sine qua non of liability, whether such liability is based in negligence or
not, is the notion of defect: "the notion that the product in question has
fallen short of what it ought to have been."68 In what circumstances,
then, will tort law label a product defective? What must be proved by
the plaintiff in order to establish this universal prerequisite to liability?
It would be very difficult to describe a priori every conceivable
way in which a given product may fall short of what it ought to have
been. There must be thousands of reasons why, for instance, a
lawnmower may in certain circumstances be defective. Nonetheless,
according to a viewpoint to which this author adheres, it is both possible
and useful to classify product defects in three general categories. 69 Case
law suggests that a tort action involving a product will most often be
based on one or more of the following theories: (1) the unit at issue (i.e.,
67 D.W. Boivin, "Negligence, Strict Liability, and Manufacturer Failure to Warn: On Fitting
Round Pegs in a Square Hole" (1993) 16 Dalhousie LJ. 299 at 302-04.
68 Products Liability, supra note 3 at 38.
69 See, generally, W.P. Keeton, "The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-A Review
of Basic Principles" (1980) 45 Missouri L. Rev. 579.
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the specific product that caused damage to the plaintiff) fails to meet the
specifications espoused by its manufacturer with respect to products of
its kind; (2) the specifications adopted by the manufacturer are
themselves flawed, leading to a line of unreasonably dangerous products
of which the unit at issue is representative; and (3) a lack of correlation
exists between a non-obvious danger related to the product at issue (or
sometimes the particular unit) and the safety information communicated
by its manufacturer. In other words, the product is said to be defective
because of poor manufacturing, poor design, and/or lack of warning.
70
Thus, depending on the focus of the argument, a product liability action
is usually described as involving either a "manufacturing defect," a
"design defect," or some "failure to warn." I shall offer some
straightforward examples before attempting to define these concepts.
The case of Donoghue,71 where a consumer allegedly found a
snail in an opaque bottle of ginger beer, offers a classic example of a
manufacturing defect. There, the plaintiff's theory was that the
particular unit she came in contact with (i.e., the bottle of ginger beer)
was defective because it fell short of its manufacturer's own
specifications for products of its kind. The defendant was not in the
business of manufacturing ginger beer with mollusc parts; it was in the
business of manufacturing quality ginger beer, free of unintended
properties. Because the presence of this foreign substance was not
planned (i.e., it was not part of the product's design), the plaintiffs
theory proceeded to suggest that the defect was somehow linked to the
product's manufacturing process; that is, the snail made its way into the
unit at some point between the design of the product and its supply to
the market. This type of defect may be contrasted with the one involved
in Nicholson,72 where a riding lawnmower caught fire while being
refuelled. There, the product was not challenged on the ground of
somehow failing to meet its manufacturers specifications. The
lawnmower the plaintiffs had purchased was exactly what it was
supposed to be, at least from the viewpoint of its manufacturer's
requirements. Rather, the theory of the case was based on a problem
70 J.J. Phillips argues that "misrepresentation" constitutes a fourth possible theory: see "A
Synopsis of the Developing Law of Products Liability" (1978) 28 Drake L. Rev. 317 at 343-52; and
Noel & Phillips, supra note 37. This theory is not discussed in this article because, standing alone, a
misrepresentation cannot render a product "defective." A bag containing arsenic and wrongly
labelled as containing salt creates an unreasonable risk of injury, but does not in any way affect the
nature of the product being sold. In my view, such a theory concerns the law of negligent and
fraudulent misrepresentation, more than the law of products liability.
71 Supra note 2.
72 Supra note 2.
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with the specifications themselves. It was argued (and accepted by the
court) that the product's battery, which contained uncovered terminals,
was in too close proximity with its gas reservoir, thereby creating an
unreasonable risk of fire. This was the case not only with the plaintiffs
unit, but with every single lawnmower of similar design manufactured by
the defendant. The plaintiffs theory suggested that a safer and
reasonable alternative existed and that the product's design was thus, in
itself, defective. In other words, according to this argument, the product
fell short of what it ought to have been, rather than of what it was
supposed to be. As for the failure-to-warn theory, a fine example is
provided by Lambert,73 where a fire was caused when fumes of a highly
volatile and flammable sealer came into contact with a furnace pilot
light. In this case, the plaintiffs theory was neither that the product
failed to meet any of the manufacturer's specifications nor that its design
was somehow unreasonably dangerous. Rather, the product was exactly
what it was supposed to be (a highly volatile and flammable floor sealer)
and it performed exactly as it ought to have in the circumstances
(explode when exposed to an open flame). Theoretically, an argument
could have been made that the product ought not to catch fire when
exposed to an open flame or that it ought not to evaporate so readily.
That is, one could argue that the product was poorly designed. However,
the plaintiff wisely chose to base his main argument on the lack of safety
information relating to dangers inherent in the product's normal use.
The manufacturer gave general warnings about the product's
flammability and volatility, but did not warn against leaving a furnace
pilot light on when applying the sealer in a basement. Thus, the
manufacturer was criticized not for supplying a product that evaporated
and caught fire when exposed to open flames, but for not supplying the
information required to enable consumers to deal with these
propensities safely. As in Nicholson, the defect alleged in Lambert (and
found to exist by the court) was present not only in the plaintiffs unit,
but in every can of sealer similarly manufactured by the defendant.
Further, as in the former case, the product fell short of what it ought to
have been (a highly flammable and volatile product with detailed
warnings), rather than of what it was supposed to be.
With these examples in mind, I now review some general
definitions of the three recognized types of defects and attempt to
underscore the fundamental characteristics of each. Prosser and Keeton
offer one of the most concise and accurate definitions of a
manufacturing defect in their famous treatise on the law of torts: "an
73 Supra note 2.
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abnormality or a condition that was unintended, and makes the product
more dangerous than it would have been as intended."74 In other words, a
manufacturing defect is a dangerous departure from a product's
intended design-a departure from the manufacturer's own
specifications for the product that makes it dangerous to a consumer's
person or property.75 A product that contains a manufacturing defect is
not, in some sense, the manufacturer's own product. Because* of the
defect, the product has become different from what it was supposed to
be and is now unexpectedly dangerous. A manufacturing defect
therefore exists when both of the following are present: (1) a difference
between the unit at issue (the product that caused damage to the
plaintiff) and similar products manufactured by the defendant; and (2)
an evaluation that this difference renders this unit dangerous to a
consumer's person or property.
A manufacturing defect may manifest itself in various ways. For
instance, the defect may be the absence of a required component part,
the presence of some foreign element, or the lower than intended quality
of some important feature in the unit. Moreover, there may be various
reasons why the manufacturing defect occurred. For example, the defect
may be due to the actions or omissions of an individual employee failing
to perform his or her duties, or to the inadequacy of the systems of
construction, inspection, and testing used by the manufacturer. In all
cases involving manufacturing defects, however, the plaintiff's argument
appears to run along the following lines: at some point between the
design of the product and its supply to the market (i.e., during the
construction or marketing processes), something occurred which
resulted in the defendant supplying a product that fell dangerously below
its intended standards. As noted by Twerski and Henderson,
manufacturing defects typically occur in only a small percentage of units
in a product line. 76 Stated somewhat differently, the majority of
products of any given line supplied by a manufacturer correspond to
74 W.P. Keeton et aL, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West,
1984) at 695 [emphasis added]. See also Keeton, supra note 69 at 585-86.
75 See also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 62 at 1515 ("manufacturing defects are
dangerous departures from a product's intended design"); P.E. Herzog, "Recent Developments in
Products Liability in the United States" (1990) 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 539 at 541 ("the product is not
what it was intended to be"); W.F. Zenner, "The Interrelationship Between Design Defects and
Warnings in Products Liability" (1989) 11 George Mason U.L. Rev. 171 at 175 ("a particular unit
can have a manufacturing or construction defect if it differs from what the manufacturer intended
to produce"); and R.A. Epstein, Modem Products Liability Law (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1980) at 69 ("the product is dangerous because it does not conform to the design").
76 Supra note 62 at 1515.
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their specifications; it is the exceptional unit which departs dangerously
from its intended design.
There are two critical points here. First, the task of determining
whether or not a particular product contains a manufacturing defect is
relatively straightforward. With respect to the "difference" element, all
that is required is a comparison between the unit that caused damage to
the plaintiff (e.g., Ms Donoghue's bottle of ginger beer) and other
products manufactured according to specifications (e.g., bottles of ginger
beer manufactured by Stevenson). If the product at issue is different
from others of its kind (e.g., it contains a snail), the only remaining
question is whether or not this unexpected deviation from intended
specifications is an improvement (the unit is now safer than its
counterparts) or a defect (the unit is now more dangerous). Since
damage is another requirement for the tort of negligence, the plaintiff
bringing the action will allegedly have suffered some form of harm as a
result of the manufacturing defect. The question will thus be whether
this damage, presuming it is recognized by law, is sufficiently attributable
to the deviation from the manufacturer's specifications (a question akin
to causation) and sufficiently important (a question akin to damages) as
to find the product dangerous.
Second, the question of manufacturing defect is completely
independent from any question related to the reasonable care exercised
by the manufacturer in supplying its product. In order to determine
whether the unit at issue is dangerously different from others of its kind,
it is not necessary to address the manufacturer's negligence. The
manufacturer's knowledge or foreseeability of the deviation (regardless
of when these are determined 77 and whether they are presumed 78), the
probability of this deviation occurring, the costs of preventing it from
occurring, the course of conduct adopted by other manufacturers
similarly situated, and so on, are all irrelevant considerations to the issue
of whether or not the unit that caused damage to the plaintiff is
dangerously different from other products manufactured by the
defendant according to specifications. I am not suggesting that these
considerations are intrinsically irrelevant to the manufacturer's liability
(the question addressed under Part IV, below), but they clearly add
nothing to the task of finding a manufacturing defect. Stated somewhat
77 See G. Calabresi & AX. Klevorick, "Four Tests for Liability in Torts" (1985) 14 J. Leg.
Stud. 585, on the links between knowledge, time of knowledge, and various standards of liability.
78 See W. Wertheimer, "Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability: The
Empire Strikes Back" (1992) 60 Cin. L. Rev. 1183, on the relationship between negligence, strict
liability, and presuming knowledge of danger.
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differently, asking "does product X contain a manufacturing defect?" is
not the same as asking "why does product X contain a manufacturing
defect?" At this time, Canadian tort law requires that both questions be
asked successively. Indeed, in theory, a manufacturer will not be liable
simply for supplying a product containing a manufacturing defect; lack of
reasonable care in relation to this defect must also be proven. This,
however, is an independent issue from whether the product itself is
defective. To determine this latter issue, one need not look into the
reasons for the alleged defect (e.g., the negligence of an employee or the
inadequacy of the inspection and testing measures); rather, it is sufficient
to consider the result at hand (e.g., the snail in the bottle). Thus, with
respect to manufacturing defects, there is a very clear line between the
"defect" element of the tort and the "negligence" element, both of which
are currently required in theory. As is often said, the former focuses
exclusively on the product whereas the latter also focuses on the
manufacturer's conduct.79 After discussing design defects and failure to
warn, I will explain why I believe liability for manufacturing defects
ought to turn on outcomes rather than reasons.
The other two categories of defects are not the primary focus of
this article, but they share an important characteristic which
distinguishes them from manufacturing defects. Indeed, with respect to
both design defects and failure to warn, there is no clear line separating
the issue of "defect" on the one hand, from the issue of "negligence."
That is, concepts relating to the reasonable care exercised by the
manufacturer form an intrinsic part of the determination as to whether
the product at issue is defective for any of these two alternative grounds.
A conclusion that a particular design is defective implies, at least to some
extent, a criticism of the care exercised by the manufacturer in the supply
of its product. Likewise, a conclusion that a manufacturer failed to warn
consumers of a non-obvious danger related to its product's use suggests
that the manufacturer thereby acted negligently. In my view, the reason
for this distinction may be found in the focus of each theory: whereas the
inquiry in a manufacturing defect case focuses on a result (the condition
of the plaintiffs unit) and compares it to what the product was supposed
to be, the inquiries in design defect and failure-to-warn cases focus on a
choice (the design adopted/the warnings given) and asks whether this
79 Many courts in the United States use the product (defect)/conduct (negligence) dichotomy
to distinguish strict products liability from liability based in fault. The former standard is said to
focus exclusively on the condition of the product supplied by the defendant; that is, it asks only
whether the product is dangerously defective. See, for example, Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20
573 P.2d 443 at 447 (Cal. 1978); Jackson v. Coast Paint and Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 at 812 (9th
Cir. 1974); and Anderson, supra note 63.
1995] 509
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
choice ought to have been different. In the former inquiry, the argument
with respect to defect may proceed entirely without reference to the
usual concepts of the law of negligence. Indeed, these concepts are
currently tacked on once the preliminary inquiry as to defect is over. In
the latter inquiry, however, concepts such as cost-benefit weighing and
foreseeability of risk are central to the very question of defect.
A- design defect occurs when the product is manufactured in
conformity with its intended specifications, but the specifications
themselves create unreasonable risks for consumers. Design defects
originate in the initial stage of a product's development, where the
product is conceived, sketched, and planned. It is during this phase that
a manufacturer decides, for example, what the purpose of the product is,
in what conditions it ought to be used, what types of materials will be
used in its construction, what features and safety devices will be
incorporated into it, and what type of equipment will be used to create
the final product. A design defect crystallizes prior to the manufacturing
process, when a choice is consciously made to construct a product
according to certain specifications and it is discovered that a reasonable
variation from these specifications would have created a less dangerous
product. As often noted, when a design defect is alleged, the stakes for
the manufacturer are quite high. When the design of the product
allegedly causing damage to the plaintiff is found to be defective, the
whole line of' products manufactured according to the same
specifications are, by necessary implication, also defective.80 Stated
somewhat bluntly, a manufacturer exposes itself to much greater liability
by supplying a line of products made according to a faulty design, than by
supplying the odd product that falls short of a design which is itself
beyond reproach.81
The hallmark distinction between manufacturing and design
defects is, in my view, the following: an inquiry into the existence of a
design defect requires a second-guessing of a consciously made choice
whereas an inquiry into the existence of a manufacturing defect requires
only a comparison between the injury-causing unit and other products of
its kind. Since a choice rather than an outcome is the issue, assessing
whether a particular design is defective is much more intricate than
determining whether a manufacturing defect is present. In the latter
case, an objective and readily applicable standard is available: the
product's condition is judged according to the manufacturer's own
80 Whether these other products give rise to liability in tort depends, of course, on whether
they have also caused damage recognized by law as giving rise to compensation.
81 See, for example, Epstein, supra note 75 at 69.
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specifications. In the former case, however, that standard itself must be
scrutinized. The question then becomes how a court can determine
whether the choice made by the manufacturer poses unreasonable
dangers to consumers.
Courts in Canada and in the United States have resorted to
various methods and have taken into account numerous considerations
on this issue. The main approaches in the United States are labelled
"consumer-expectation" and "risk-utility. '8 2 According to the former, a
design is found to be dangerously defective "if it is dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchased it with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to the product's characteristics."83 According to the latter,
the approach used by a clear majority of jurisdictions and arguably by
courts in Ontario,8 4 a product is defectively designed when "the
magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility of the product."8 5
Describing these methods in greater detail is beyond the scope of this
article. Suffice it to say that, despite any theoretical distinctions relating
to the focus of their respective analyses, the two methods share the
following characteristic: they require weighing, on the one hand, the
costs associated with preventing the type of accident which occurred (i.e.,
the costs of choosing different-and safer-specifications than the ones
challenged) and, on the other hand, the benefits that would result from
making such a choice. Obviously, the greater the gap between these two
variables, the easier it is to decide whether a particular design is
defective.
Considerations discussed in case law and doctrine that are
relevant with respect to the "costs associated with prevention"
component include the following: (1) the utility of the product, as
currently designed, to the public and to the individual plaintiff (i.e., what
society would be giving up if the product were found defective); (2) the
nature of the product; (3) the availability of an alternative and safer
design to the one being challenged; (4) whether such an alternative
design is grounded in statutory requirements, common practice, or
82 See Keeton, supra note 69 at 588; and Henderson & Twerski, supra note 62 at 1532-34.
83 See Keeton et at., supra note 74 at 698.
8 4 See, for example, Nicholson, supra note 2; Gallantv. Beitz (1983), 42 O.R. (2d) 86 (H.C.);
Rentway Canada Ltd v. Laidlaw Transport Ltd (1989), 49 C.C.L.T. 150 (Ont. H.C.), affd [1994] OJ.
No. 50 (QL); and Stevens (Guardian of) v. Forney, [1993] O.J. No. 759 (QL). See also Baker v.
Suzuki Motor Co. (1993), 17 C.C.L.T. (2d) 241 (Alta Q.B.); and McEvoy v. Ford Motor Co., (1989) 45
B.C.L.R. (2d) 363 (S.C.)
8 5 Keeton et al., supra note 74 at 699.
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theory; (5) the costs associated with knowing about this alternative
design at the time the product was supplied (i.e., was the information
known, knowable, or not discoverable according to existing state of the
art); and (6) the costs associated with implementing this alternative
design in the future, including not only the costs borne directly by the
manufacturer but also those which affect society in general (i.e., the
general costs of finding the design defective) 8 6 As for considerations
that address the "benefits" of not choosing the challenged design, these
same sources speak of at least the following: (7) the utility of the
product, if designed according to alternative specifications, to the public
and to the individual plaintiff (i.e., what society would be receiving);
(8) the nature and degree of danger associated with the product's
current design; (9) the probability that said danger will re-materialize in
the future if no changes are imposed; (10) the degree to which an
alternative design decreases the danger; and (11) the manufacturer's
ability to spread the costs associated with improving the safety of its
design.
It is evident that no easy solution exists for determining when a
particular design is dangerously defective. Case law and doctrine make
do with alternate approaches and numerous factors, but they provide
little guidance as to how these principles ought to be applied in any given
case. The inquiry is clearly more involved (and arguably more
subjective) than the one required for manufacturing defects, where the
injury-causing product is simply compared to others made according to
specifications. When the specifications themselves are said to be
defective, a court must turn to some external measure in order to judge
the condition of the manufacturer's product; that is, the trier must
"leave" the manufacturer's plant, so to speak, and find some external
way of assessing whether the right choice was made. Currently, the
criterion chosen is deeply embedded in the law of negligence, even in
those jurisdictions which adhere to a theory of strict products liability.
As evident from the factors noted above, judging a product's design
requires consideration of all relevant circumstances surrounding the
conception, marketing, manufacture, and supply of the product in
question. In particular, it is highly pertinent to determine what the
defendant's competitors are doing in similar circumstances and what
knowledge the manufacturer had, or should have had, of safer
86 Ibid. at 698-702; C.M. Moylan, "In Pursuit of the Appropriate Standard of Liability for
Defective Product Designs" (1990) 42 Me. L Rev. 453; B. Lemer, "Strict Products Liability: The
Problem of Improperly Designed Products" (1982) 20 Osgoode Hall L.J. 250 and the cases
discussed therein, in particular, Voss v. Black& DeckerMfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983).
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alternative designs at the time of supply.87 Regardless of the standard of
liability adopted, the question with respect to defect is fundamentally
one of balance: is this product, as currently designed, worth the cost it
imposes on society in general and on any given user? A product's design
is labelled defective when the utility is not worth the risk or, stated
somewhat differently, when the costs of preventing a similar accident are
outweighed by the benefits of such an expenditure. Accordingly,
determining whether a design defect exists is intrinsically akin to
determining whether the defendant acted negligently in the
circumstances---"the underlying negligence calculus is inescapable."8 8
Both elements may be satisfied by one inquiry. This result is inevitable
regardless of the standard of liability adopted; the ultimate question
remains whether in the circumstances, the manufacturer's choice ought
to have been different.
Much of the same can be said about the law of failure to warn.
According to this theory, a manufacturer is subject to liability for
providing inadequate warnings "about a risk or hazard inherent in the
way a product is designed that is related to the intended uses as well as
the reasonably foreseeable uses that may be made of the products it
sells."89 In essence, this theory of products liability is but an instance of
the defective design theory since, in both cases, the plaintiff generally
argues that the specifications adopted by the manufacturer themselves
create unreasonable dangers to consumers and their property. That is,
in order to establish the prerequisite product defect, the theory again
centres on choices made by the defendant in the conception, planning,
sketching, and marketing of a line of products of which the plaintiff's
unit is representative, and asks whether these choices ought to have been
different in the circumstances-whether the manufacturer made a
87 Some have suggested that the only difference between negligence and strict liability is
whether knowledge of the risk (Le., foreseeability) needs to be proven (negligence) or is conclusively
presumed (strict liability). See, for example, Wertheimer, supra note 78; and J.F. Vargo, "Caveat
Emptor Will the A.LI. Erode Strict Liability in the Restatement (Third) for Products Liability?"
(1993) 10 Touro L. Rev. 21 at 24-25: "What distinguishes strict liability from negligence? It is very
simple. One must impute the knowledge of the relevant danger or defect at the time of trial to the
manufacturer. That is it." However, in my view, there is much more to a finding of negligence than
a finding that the risk was known or foreseen. Foreseeability is but a threshold. A finding of
negligence requires, in addition, a balancing of numerous factors including the gravity of the danger
involved, the probability of its occurrence-which is different from foreseeability: Bolton v. Stone,
[1951] AC. 850 (H.L.)-and the costs associated with remedial measures.
88 See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176 at 183-84 (Mich. 1984), on the standard of
liability in a design defect case. For similar observations, see Balido v. Improved Machinery Inc., 105
Cal. Rptr. 890 at 895 (Ct. App. 1972); and Fibreboard Corp., supra note 63 at 1174.
8 9 Keeton et al., supra note 74 at 685.
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justifiable choice in not giving the type of warning now requested by the
plaintiff. In establishing defect, failure to warn thus addresses the same
question as any other tort action based on negligence in which the
reasonableness of the defendants conduct is at issue. In this respect, the
observations made in the preceding paragraphs about the difficulty of
completely disregarding fault when faced with an alleged design defect
apply here with equal force.
To be sure, there are differences between these two categories of
products liability. Failure to warn is obviously limited to challenging
those specifications which relate to the safety information provided (or
not) by manufacturers. More significantly, unlike both categories of
defect reviewed above, failure to warn is a residual theory of liability: it
addresses only the correlation between a hazard associated with the
defendant's product and the information conveyed to the plaintiff. The
argument is not that the hazard is unreasonable per se (the essence of
design defect and manufacturing defect arguments), but that ignorance
of it creates an excessive risk. Failure to warn presupposes that the
danger associated with the product's use (that of which a warning is
demanded) is, alone, insufficient to base liability, but asserts a residual
right to disclosure of that which happened. This distinguishing feature
makes failure to warn the most flexible yet problematic theory of
manufacturer liability. It is flexible because it may be invoked as a
supplement to one of the two theories discussed earlier,90 or to impeach
a product otherwise beyond reproach in its design and manufacture. 91
Indeed, its premise appears to be as follows: if two identical products are
compared, one including a complete description of the product's non-
obvious dangers and the other omitting such information, the latter's
90 See, for example, Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, [1974] S.C.R. 1189
[hereinafter Rivtow Marine] (failure to warn of design defect in mounting of crane); Nicholson, supra
note 2 (failure to warn of design defect in location of lawnmower gas reservoir); Setrakov
Construction Ltd. v. Winder's Storage & Distributors Ltd. (1981), 128 D.L.R. (3d) 301 (Sask. C.A.)
(failure to warn of design defect in trailer's suspension); McCain Foods Ltd. v. Grand Falls Industries
Ltd. (1991), 116 N.B.R. (2d) 23 (C.A.) [hereinafter McCain Foods] (failure to warn of
manufacturing defect in mounting of crane); and Can-Arc Helicopters Ltd. v. Textron Ina (1991), 86
D.L.R. (4th) 404 (B.C.S.C.) (failure to warn of manufacturing defect in helicopter gear).
91 See, for example, Lambert, supra note 2 (failure to warn about danger of leaving pilot lights
on when applying a flammable floor-sealer); Meilleurv. U.N.I.-Crete Can. Ltd. (1985), 15 C.L.R. 191
(Ont. KC.) (failure to warn about danger of blindness when using a liquid concrete additive without
protective eye wear); Smithson v. Saskem Chemicals Ltd. (1985), [1986] 1 W.W.R. 145 (Sask. Q.B.)
(failure to warn about danger of blindness when mixing different chemical drain cleaners); Buchan
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical (Canada) Ltd. (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 92 (C.A.) [hereinafter Buchan] (failure
to warn about danger of stroke associated with use of oral contraceptives); and Pirie v. MSDAuguet
(1989), 96 N.B.R (2d) 337 (Q.B.) (failure to warn about danger of bacterial soft rot in potatoes,
associated with use of herbicide).
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silence renders it more dangerous to consumers and their property than
the former. This argument holds regardless of the nature of the
undisclosed hazard, that is, whether the risk is created by some (other)
defect in the design or manufacture of the product at issue92 or by some
danger inherent to the use of an otherwise properly designed and made
product.93 However, this characteristic also makes failure to warn an
easy target for abuse. All products create risks to users and their
property. Because a successive failure-to-warn argument does not
require a finding that the risk at issue is unreasonable per se, only a
finding that the manufacturer's silence is unreasonable, the scope of this
theory of liability is considerably broad. When one considers the range
of risks associated with the use of any given product, the elasticity of the
concept of disclosure, the very low costs of the remedial measures
requested, and the fact that an entire product line is usually under
scrutiny, one can appreciate the fears expressed by some commentators
that failure to warn carries the potential of making manufacturers
insurers for their products.94 Indeed, a residual argument can almost
always be made that what happened to the plaintiff, that is, the loss
suffered when a risk of using the defendant's product materialized, was
inadequately disclosed by the manufacturer, thereby rendering its
product defective. One final distinguishing feature of failure to warn is
that while a design defect, by definition, crystallizes prior to the
manufacturing process and thus before the product's supply in the
market, the former defect may also arise after both of these phases. A
manufacturer's duty to supply adequate information to its consumers is
continuous and is not necessarily expended following supply.95 For
example, a manufacturer may be liable for not warning known
consumers of unreasonable dangers associated with the product's use
92 As in Rivtow Marine; and the other cases cited supra note 90.
93 As in Lambert, supra note 2; and the other cases cited supra note 91.
94 See generally M.S. Jacobs, "Toward a Process-Based Approach To Failure-to-Warn Law"
(1992) 71 N.C. L. Rev. 121; American Law Institute, Reporter's Study: Enterprise Responsibility for
Personal Injury (1991), c. 7; and J.A. Henderson & A.D. Twerski, "Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn" (1990) 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 265. See also P.W. Huber,
Liability: The Legal Revolution and its Consequences (New York: Basic Books, 1988) at 51-58; G.L.
Priest, "Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate" in R.E. Litan & C. Winston, eds., Liability:
Perspectives and Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988) at 217-20; A. Schwartz,
"Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis" (1988) 97 Yale L.J 353 at 398;
and Epstein, supra note 75 at 93.
95 See, for example, Products Liability, supra note 3 at 44-45.
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discovered after the product's supply, including any known design or
manufacturing defect.96
These qualifications aside, pure strict liability is also
incompatible with a workable failure-to-warn theory. The main reason is
that, in order to determine whether the product at issue is defective (a
precondition to liability regardless of the standard applied), the inquiry
cannot focus exclusively on the product (an outcome), but must also
address the reasons explaining the product's current condition (a
choice). The name itself indicates that this theory of liability is
concerned with the latter; after all, a manufacturer is liable for failing to
warn a consumer of a risk associated with its product, not merely
because a consumer was unaware of that risk. Under pure strict liability,
the issues would be limited to whether the plaintiff was injured or
suffered property damage as a result of the defendant's product and, if
so, whether the plaintiff was fully aware of the risk when using the
product. The focus would be exclusively on the defendant's product and
the plaintiff's awareness of the risks: does the product provide
consumers with adequate warnings of the hazards associated with its
use? Implementing such a standard would be extremely difficult,
however, precisely because of this theory's residual nature. This
standard provides no guidelines whatsoever for severing frivolous claims
from those with merit, nor does it provide manufacturers with any
discernible limits to their liability. For every risk associated with every
use of a given product there is a potential argument that the product
conveyed inadequate warnings to consumers. This potential is all the
greater considering the adaptable nature of disclosure; a warning's broad
range of explicitness compounds the broad range of hazards. Pure strict
liability in this field could indeed convert manufacturers into insurers.
As noted recently by the Supreme Court of California, one of the
founders of strict products liability, "[s]trict liability, however, was never
intended to make the manufacturer or distributor of a product its
insurer."97
Moreover, focusing exclusively on the product's condition would
not be consistent with the policy goals usually associated with safety
labels. The reasons for imposing a duty to warn on manufacturers
concern accident prevention and personal autonomy.98 As suggested
9 6 See, for example, Rivtow Marine; and the other cases cited supra note 90.
9 7Anderson, supra note 63.
98 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 94 at 285-86; and M.A. Pittenger, "Reformulating
the Strict Liability Failure to Warn" (1992) 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1509.
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above, a product that provides warnings of inherent dangers, warnings of
any known defect, directions for safe use, and guidelines to deal with
emergency situations, is presumptively safer than a counterpart with a
blank label. Such information enables consumers personally to manage
the risks they are bound to encounter and, provided the information is
accessed, read, understood, and acted on, warnings can play an
important part in tort law's goal of reducing the social costs of
accidents.99 Warnings also enable consumers to make informed choices
in the marketplace by offering them means to decide, for instance,
whether or not to buy product X, whether to buy it from manufacturer A
or from manufacturer B, and how to use it in order to minimize any
possible risk. Consumers, not unlike patients,1°° have a right to personal
autonomy and integrity in decision making. Adequate disclosure of
hazards to person and property promotes this right, enabling consumers
to decide whether, and in what measure, they will use products
manufactured with them in mind. Again, pursuit of this objective is
contingent on the information being accessible, read, and understood. A
standard of liability for failure to warn focusing exclusively on the
condition of the product, however, could interfere with both of these
goals by making manufacturers concerned more with the quantity and
specificity of their warnings than with the quality and accessibility of the
information conveyed to consumers.
In order to be fair, workable, and functional, the standard of
liability for failure to warn must consider the reasons explaining the
product's current condition: why is the warning requested by the plaintiff
not included on the defendant's product? In fact, case law in negligence
and strict liability jurisdictions confirms that, regardless of the language
chosen, courts do not focus exclusively on the product when addressing
the defect issue.101 They have required some unsatisfactory explanation
before finding that a product's warning is defective or, more accurately,
before finding that a defendant failed to adequately warn the plaintiff.
Most significantly, courts in Canada and the United States initially
inquire whether the manufacturer owed a duty to warn the plaintiff of
the risk which materialized, a question remotely similar to the duty of
care issue addressed or assumed in all other negligence actions. In
answering this question, they focus primarily on the manufacturer's
99 On the relevance of this goal, see G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and
EconomicAnatysis (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970) at 24-33.
100 On the influence of personal autonomy in shaping a doctor's duty of disclosure, see Reibl
v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880; and Ciarlariello v. Schacter, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119.
101 See, for example, Boivin, supra note 67; and the articles cited supra note 64.
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foreseeability of the risk of personal injury or property damage to the
plaintiff or, as it is sometimes put, its actual or constructive knowledge of
the hazard. This notion of foreseeability is intrinsic to the very concept
of negligence: a foreseeable risk is one which should influence the
choices made in the marketing of a product.
In summary, although a court can focus exclusively on an
outcome (the defendant's product) and ignore the reasons given for this
result (the defendant's conduct) in determining whether a manufacturing
defect is present, negligence concepts such as cost-benefit balancing and
foreseeability of risk are inseparable from inquiries into the
defectiveness of a design or of a warning. Unlike manufacturing defects,
a separate question as to whether the manufacturer was negligent in
relation to the defect is unnecessary in such cases. By concluding that
the product supplied by the defendant contains a faulty design, or that
the defendant failed to warn consumers as to non-obvious dangers
inherent in the product's use, a court is simultaneously concluding that
the manufacturer somehow failed to exercise reasonable care in the
circumstances; that is, the manufacturer ought to have made a different
choice. Accordingly, I believe the question of whether to adopt "strict
liability" with respect to design defects and failure to warn is
fundamentally a red herring. As the experience in the United States of
the past thirty years shows, issues such as a balancing of costs and
benefits and foreseeability of risk will be part of the inquiry into liability,
whatever standard is officially adopted. There, product and conduct are
intrinsically linked. In closing, I am not suggesting that a pure
negligence standard is currently used in Canada or in the United States
with respect to design defect and failure to warn. Indeed, some elements
of strict liability coexist in these areas, even in Canada where a standard
of fault is adhered to in theory.102 I am suggesting, however, that a
workable pure strict liability standard cannot properly be implemented
without fundamental changes being made to the underlying theories of
design defect and failure to warn.
IV. LIABILITY FOR INJURIOUS MANUFACTURING
OUTCOMES
Negligence concepts are irrelevant when determining whether
the unit causing damage to the plaintiff contains a manufacturing defect,
but are they also irrelevant in fixing the manufacturer's liability for the
102 See, for example, Boivin, supra note 67.
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defect? The official answer is clear: even when a manufacturing defect is
at issue, Canadian courts continue to insist on basing liability on some
finding of negligence. Fridman describes the state of the law as follows:
"[Lliability can only arise if there was negligence of some kind on the part of the party
responsible for putting the thing into circulation and causing its defect or ultimate
transference to the one subsequently injured. Without proof of some act or omission that
amounts to negligence, there can be no liability."
103
In other words, even though a plaintiff proves that he or she suffered
recognized damages as a result of a product which is dangerously
different from its intended design, the plaintiff must also prove lack of
reasonable care on the part of the manufacturer in relation to this defect
before recovering. Liability in tort is thus currently predicated on
unreasonable choices rather than injurious outcomes. Our courts not
only ask whether a manufacturing defect occurred; if it did, they also ask
why and demand from the plaintiff (at least in theory) some explanation
compatible with lack of reasonable care on the part of the defendant. In
this part, I argue that the basis of liability in this area ought to be the
dangerously defective product supplied by the manufacturer, rather than
the reasons behind this result.
It should be noted at the outset that under Canadian tort law
liability may, in some circumstances, depend exclusively on whether the
defendant caused a particular injurious outcome to materialize. This
principle is at the core of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher,104 the law
pertaining to dangerous animals, the law of defamation, and the law of
nuisance. In each of these areas, liability may be predicated solely on a
result, that is, an injury to the plaintiff's person or property by either a
"non-natural use" of the defendants' land, a dangerous animal under the
defendant's control, false and defamatory information published by the
defendant, or an unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of the
plaintiff's property. Lack of reasonable care by the defendant in relation
to this result is not required to establish his or her liability, and due
diligence in preventing the outcome offers no absolute bar to
recovery.1 05 In these areas, tort law is concerned more with results than
with reasons or explanations. The question posed is not whether the
103 G.H.L Fridman, The Law of Torts in Canada, vol. 2 (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 5.
104 (1866), [1865-671 LR. 1 Ex. 265, aff'd (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 330 [hereinafter Rylands].
105 See, for example, Fleming, supra note 22 at 335 (Rylands), 337 (dangerous animals), 539
(defamation), and 424-25 (nuisance). The Supreme Court of Canada recently confirmed that lack
of negligence is not a bar to nuisance: Tock v. St. John's Metropolitan Area Board, [1989] 2 S.C.R.
1181.
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defendant ought to have made a different choice in the circumstances,
but whether his or her actions or omissions caused the injurious
outcome. Of course, a finding in favour of the plaintiff implies that he or
she was wronged by the defendant as well as some form of disapproval of
the defendant's behaviour. However, the crux of this wrong is not the
choice made by the defendant, but the consequence suffered by the
plaintiff. Even if the defendant took all reasonable care in the
circumstances to avoid any damage to the plaintiff, the way in which he
or she dealt with property, animals, or publications has nonetheless had
this consequence. Unless any recognized defence is available, the
defendant will have to answer for this outcome. Accordingly, with
respect to manufacturing defects, the issue is not whether to recognize
some novel form of tort liability predicated solely on results, irrespective
of choices. The question is whether the injurious outcome defined
earlier, namely, personal injury or property damage caused by a product
dangerously departing from its intended specifications, should receive a
similar treatment by our common law. I believe it should.
As noted in the introduction, strict products liability has had
authoritative proponents in Canada since the 1960s, the principal ones
being Linden J., Waddams, and the Ontario Law Reform
Commission.106  For example, Linden's arguments for the open
recognition of strict tort liability include the similarity of products and
consumption habits in Canada and the United States, the frequency of
American ownership of manufacturing plants located in Canada, the
high level of trade between the countries, as well as the familiar
arguments outlined earlier for enterprise liability made by Traynor J. in
Escola and Greenman.107 In one of his articles, Linden added that "[t]he
adoption of the strict tort liability doctrine would also be evidence that
the maturity of Canadian tort law matches that of our manufacturing
industry."108 However, Canadian courts and legislatures have generally
not responded to calls for reform. Before making a further
recommendation, it is relevant to discuss their respective reasons for not
openly adopting strict products liability. Is there any basis for the
apparent legislative and judicial apathy in this field? In retrospect, their
response may be justifiable in view of developments in the United States
following this standard's adoption in particular, its dilution in some
instances via the concept of defect. Nevertheless, I argue below that the
106 Supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
10 7 Supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
108 "Products Liability," supra note 4 at 249.
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time has come for judicial intervention, at least in circumstances where a
norm of pure strict liability is workable. In my opinion, the next phase in
the development of Canadian common law ought to witness an open
adoption of a tailored alternative basis of liability, that is, strict liability
for injurious manufacturing outcomes.
One can only speculate on the reasons for the legislative apathy
in this area. Canadian legislatures have traditionally avoided private law
substantive issues, such as the standard of liability used in judging a
defendant's conduct, unless there is some pressing reason to intervene.
Legislative reform is possible, as demonstrated in all common law
provinces by the replacement of contributory negligence with
comparative negligence, and the recognition of contribution amongst
joint tortfeasors.1 °9 However, I suspect that tort reform with respect to
products liability is perceived as being first and foremost within the
realm of the judiciary. The point, of course, is not that legislatures lack
jurisdiction to intervene, but rather that they perceive an alternative
venue for reform. The common law is flexible and capable of
accommodating minor departures from the status quo"
0 without
requiring the lengthy and expensive legislative process. The judiciary can
intervene in a more specific manner than can the legislature, limiting its
comments to the circumstances at bar and waiting to decide if different
facts should produce the same result. This view is reinforced by recent
judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada sanctioning, in appropriate
circumstances, court-made incremental changes to the common law to
ensure that it reflects the emerging needs and values of Canadian
society.111 Perhaps legislatures perceive the debate on the appropriate
basis of liability for defective products as being, by nature, one for the
country's appellate courts to resolve. The latest phase in the
development of strict products liability in the United States,
characterized by the recall of negligence elements in specified
circumstances, would apparently justify such a perception. After all, why
should a Canadian legislature enact general strict liability, as
recommended by its proponents, only to have courts in that jurisdiction
struggle to find a meaningful distinction between strict liability and
negligence and, in the long run, resort to approaches effectively identical
to the ones currently used? If the courts perceive the need for change in
1 0 9 See Fridman, supra note 103, vol. 1 at 369-72.
110 Fleming v. Atkinson, [1959] S.C.R. 513 at 535.
111 See Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750; Salituro v. R. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654; and London
Drugs, supra note 16.
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a specific area, they can proceed incrementally on a case-by-case basis.
For example, they can openly recognize that proof of negligence is
unnecessary for manufacturing defects, since a combination of res ipsa
loquitur and other evidential devices is currently used to achieve similar
ends.
Related to this concern is perhaps the view that there is no real
need to interfere with the current law.112 As noted in Part II, because of
evidential shortcuts and warranty claims there is much strict liability
already in the law. The Ontario Law Reform Commission based its
recommendations for strict products liability not on the existence of
wrongly uncompensated injured persons, but primarily on anomalies and
irrationalities within the current law 13 The Commission appeared to
say it wanted the legislature to tidy up a messy area of law. Considering
the intense competition for legislative attention, on the one hand, and
the time, money, and energy required to see a bill through the entire
process, on the other, it is no wonder that reform of this sort is low on
most legislatures' scale of priorities. Similarly, the perception may also
be that people injured by defective products are adequately compensated
for their injuries by the current tort system (since much strict liability is
already in the law) and by our relatively generous welfare system. It is
no secret that the absence of comprehensive health insurance in the
United States compels many injured persons there to turn to tort law for
compensation.11 4 There, deficiencies in the tort system are magnified as
the denial of a claim often means the denial of recovery altogether.
When comprehensive collateral compensation exists, however,
anomalies and irrationalities in tort law are clearly easier to tolerate and
excuse, and they are less often in the spotlight. After all, if the plaintiff's
claim is denied, he or she will at least be adequately covered for medical
costs in Canada. Further, with respect to other arguments in favour of
strict liability, there is no evidence to my knowledge of American
corporations dumping unsafe products in Canada so as to benefit from
more favourable products-liability laws. Neither are there any
allegations that some Canadian corporations are owned by American
citizens who unfairly seek to avoid the costs of strict liability in their
home country. Taken together, these factors may justify a conclusion
that there is no compelling reason to alter, via legislation, the standard of
112 This is the main reason that commentators such as Thompson, McLaughlin, Shannon, and
Stradiotto oppose a move towards strict products liability: see supra note 5.
113 Supra note 6 at 33. Linden criticizes this aspect of the report as it presents "an overly
optimistic view of the present law": see "Commentary," supra note 4 at 93.
114 See generally Products Liability, supra note 3 at 210.
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liability used by Canadian courts to judge a manufacturer's
responsibility. "[R]eforming the law and putting it on a more rational
basis"115 is a commendable goal. Without more, however, it is not a very
compelling ground for legislative intervention.
Another element that weakens the current case for legislative
reform is its apparent superficiality. Regardless of the standard of
liability adopted in theory, there is much similarity between the
approaches used by courts in Canada and in the United States. Contrary
to what many Canadian commentators imply, however, this
rapprochement does not result only from a watering down of the
negligence standard in Canada. True, Canadian courts effectively resort
to pure strict liability, at least when dealing with products containing
manufacturing defects. However, there is also a move towards greater
involvement of negligence in the United States with respect to defective
designs and warnings, despite the official adherence in most states to
strict liability. Thus, I submit it is premature to recommend the open
adoption in Canada of a general standard of strict liability for defective
products. Recommendations for reform should, at the very least, avoid
using the terms "negligence," "strict liability," and "defect" in too hasty a
fashion. It is necessary to look behind these concepts to see how courts
are actually treating defective products and, perhaps most importantly,
to pay more than lip-service to the distinctions between the three
categories of defects currently giving rise to liability in the two countries.
The recommendation made by the Ontario Law Reform Commission
comes short in this regard, for it suggests replacing the current rules with
a principle that liability for personal injury and damage to property in
this field, rests on the supply of a "defective product" which is broadly
defined.
Finally, it is conceivable that Canadian legislatures are also
concerned with the effects that strict products liability might have on
liability insurance and on the innovative spirit of manufacturers
-arguments sometimes made in favour of moving the law in the United
States away from strict liability16-and that they are sensitive to the
growing criticism in the United States.117 The concern here is not the
presence of an alternative forum or the absence of a valid reason to
legislate, but the fear that the benefits. of reforming the law are
115 Report on Products Liability, supra note 6 at 33.
116 See, for example, Huber, supra note 94; RJ. Stayin, "The U.S. Product Liability System: A
Competitive Advantage to Foreign Manufacturers" (1988) 14 Can.-U.S. L.J. 193; and G.S. Frazza,
"A U.S. View of the Products Liability Aspects of Innovation" (1989) 15 Can.-U.S. LU. 85.
117 Supra note 60 and accompanying text.
1995]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
outweighed by the costs, that is, by the potential harm to suppliers of
goods and to society in general from higher insurance costs and
decreased investments in innovative products. Other costs of reform
include those related directly to the legislative process. Like others, I
believe these concerns are somewhat inflated.118 The evidence to date
on the cost of strict liability is mostly anecdotal, and the information that
exists is open to various interpretations. As previously noted, much of
the recent criticism of strict products liability is addressed to issues other
than the standard of liability, such as the high awards granted by juries
and the abuse of punitive damages. 119 In other words, the criticisms
address issues which do not necessarily carry over when a change in the
standard of liability is made.
Adopting strict liability in Canada would not legally or logically
lead to, for instance, a greater reliance on jury trials in civil cases, nor
would it inevitably lead to an increased use of punitive damages awards.
Canadian jurisdictions may address all of these issues, or only the ones
believed to be relevant to the Canadian context. The choice of strict
liability does not require the choice of other aspects of products liability
law that currently exist in the United States and that may appear
undesirable. Indeed, in areas such as non-pecuniary damages, our courts
have already shown their willingness to adopt innovative and distinctively
Canadian solutions to control the costs associated with the civil liability
system.12 0 In sum, a causal connection between strict products liability
per se, on the one. hand, and higher liability insurance costs and
decreased innovation, on the other, has yet to be satisfactorily
demonstrated. Moreover, the legislative process costs of reforming
products liability are no greater than those associated with any
government bill. Having said this, it is hard to dispute the negative
impact of these concerns on society's-and the legislatures'-perception
of the problem. The recent backlash against strict products liability in
the United States has perhaps tainted the movement for reform in
118 See, for example, Report on Products Liability, supra note 6 at 71-78; Products Liability,
supra note 3 at 209; W.K. Viscusi & M.J. Moore, "Rationalizing the Relationship between Products
Liability and Innovation" in Schuck, ed., supra note 60 at 105; R.E. Litan, "The Liability Explosion
and the American Trade Performance: Myths and Realities" in Schuck, ed., supra note 60 at 127;
S.P. Croley & J.D. Hanson, "What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Recent Events
in Products Liability" (1991) 8 Yale J. on Reg. 1; and R.A. Prentice & M.E. Roszkowski, "'Tort
Reform' and the Liability 'Revolution': Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products"
(1992) 27 Gonzaga L. Rev. 251.
1 1 9 Supra note 61.
120 See Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229 [hereinafter Andrews],
(placing a cap on liability for non-pecuniary loss).
[VOL. 33 No. 3
Strict Products Liability Revisited
-Canada. At the very least, it has had a sobering effect, forcing
commentators and legislators to acknowledge the existence of new
variables. Plausibly, the need to address these issues has dissuaded some
from pursuing reform.
Undoubtedly, there are other possible reasons why most
Canadian legislatures have not reformed the law of products liability in
the manner suggested by the Ontario Law Reform Commission and
others. For example, this may simply be the result of a lack of political
will, in view of strong corporate interests and powerful lobby groups, to
introduce legislation which would have the appearance, if not the effect,
of being anti-manufacturer and pro-consumer. My goal was not to be
exhaustive in this respect, but to raise what I believe are the main
obstacles facing legislative reform. To reiterate, these hurdles are:
(1) the perception that courts are an appropriate forum to alter, if
necessary, the basis of liability for torts involving defective products;
(2) the perception that the case for reform is not, at this time, sufficiently
compelling; and (3) the concern that any possible benefits of reforming
the law would be outweighed by the social costs ensuing therefrom. As
noted, the first two obstacles are not easily challengeable, particularly
when attention is paid to the various theories of liability concealed by the
general concept of defect and the costs associated with the legislative
process. Thus, this recommendation is addressed to our common law
courts.
Reform by the judiciary, however, is faced with a set of obstacles
similar to those outlined above. In essence, it is necessary to overcome
the perception that there is no need to reform the common law of
products liability at this time. Arguably, this perception is based on the
availability of an alternative venue for reform and the weakness of the
case for reform, which includes the apprehension of significant social
costs associated with changes of the type advocated by the Ontario Law
Reform Commission and others. For reasons that follow, I believe both
of these grounds may be challenged and that, at least with respect to
manufacturing defects, some reform is required. At the outset, the
argument that courts would interfere if only faced with an appropriate
case is fundamentally flawed. Any case where there is little proof of
manufacturer negligence (and there are many)121 is an appropriate one
for making the move from the fictions underlying res ipsa loquitur and
similar evidential shortcuts to an open principle of strict tort liability for
manufacturing defects. Moreover, counsel are frequently making
121 See, for example, Farro, supra note 17; and LeBlanc, supra note 18, discussed below, under
Part V, below.
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submissions on the issue of strict products liability. 122 If our courts are
refusing to make this or any similar change, it is by choice and not
because they are offered no opportunity to interfere.
The alternative-forum argument is sweeping when made by the
judiciary. The legislature is not the only body for altering the basis of
liability for torts involving defective products. To be sure, major reforms
with uncertain ramifications should be left to legislatures.1 23 Moreover,
uniform reform is commendable and more easily accomplished by
legislative bodies. The Supreme Court of Canada held, however, that
courts have the power and the duty to make incremental changes to the
common law when the circumstances require such a reform. 124 Perhaps
reforms of the magnitude proposed by the Ontario Law Reform
Commission are not "incremental" and should be avoided, but a move
from a weak standard of negligence to open strict liability is, arguably,
the type of judicial reform contemplated by the Supreme Court, at least
with respect to manufacturing defects where something akin to this
standard is already applied. Thus, while a legislature is, to some extent,
justified in avoiding the issue since an alternative forum for reform exists
and a legislature, strictly speaking, has no duty to legislate in such a
matter of substantive private law, courts may be criticized for awaiting
legislative intervention without. more. It is one thing to say the
circumstances are not appropriate for change. It is quite another to
suggest that, regardless of the circumstances and the need for reform,
courts have no jurisdiction to intervene. The latter suggestion is
misleading since courts perceiving a need to act within the boundaries
established by the Supreme Court not only have the power, but the
obligation, to do so. This duty is all the greater considering the
improbability of legislative reform to products liability. "The courts
alone can fashion a remedy. They should do so, with the knowledge that
the legislature will act if it does not approve." 125
The problem, however, is that judicial reform of products liability
is not perceived as warranted. The duty discussed by the Supreme Court
in cases such as London Drugs126 is triggered only when strong reasons
exist for deviating from a strict application of the rule of precedent; in
122 See, for example, Buchan, supra note 91; McCain Foods, supra note 90; and Hollis v. Birch
(1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 520 (B.C.C.A.).
123 See the recent trilogy, supra note 111.
124 Ibid
125 "Reform by the Judiciary," supra note 60 at 331-32.
126 Supra note 16.
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this case, from the rule that proof of negligence is required to sustain a
manufacturer's liability in tort. The arguments against such a departure
focus mainly on: (1) the relatively small number of cases before our
courts involving defective products compared to the United States;
127
(2) the infrequency of decisions where it is lack of proof with respect to
negligence which causes a dismissal of the claim;128 (3) the availability of
evidential devices that help with the problem of establishing
negligence; 129 (4) the recall by American courts of negligence elements
when dealing with design defects and failure to warn;130 (5) the existence
of a more generous welfare system in Canada compared to the United
States, diminishing the number of claims brought and playing down the
weaknesses of the tort system; 31 (6) the magnitude of the reform
coupled with the uncertainty of its ramifications on commerce,
insurance, and litigation;13 2 and (7) the view that, in the end, the issue is
academic and has few material implications for consumers.133 I reject
the social costs argument, for reasons already given, particularly since we
are talking about a very specific area of products liability: an area
characterized by the exceptional departure from intended specifications.
The other arguments amount to the following: since very few potential
plaintiffs would actually benefit from a rule of strict liability, the status
quo should be preserved. This proposition may be valid when a
legislature is proactively considering the question, but it should not carry
the same weight when courts are responding to requests made in the
context of litigation. In the following paragraphs, I contend that when
127 For instance, Henderson and Twerski "conservatively estimate" that no fewer than 3,000
published court opinions have cited § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts from 1965 to 1992,
making it one of the most frequently cited sections of this Restatement: see supra note 62 at 1512.
128 Products Liability, supra note 3 at 58; and Report on Products Liability, supra note 6 at 18.
But see "Commentary," supra note 4 at 93.
129 Supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
13 0 Supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
13 1 Supra note 114 and accompanying text.
132 The "insurance crisis" of the 1980s in the United States is often quoted by Canadian courts
as a reason for controlling tort liability: see, for example, Andrews, supra note 120; and Snell v.
Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311 (refusing to place on defendants an onus of disproving causation).
Similarly, the perceived costs of strict products liability shed some light on the current apathy vis-l-
vis this concept.
133 Arguably, cultural, sociological, political, and institutional differences between Canada
and the United States may also explain the perception that reform of the sort adopted in the United
States should be avoided. See generally J.R.S. Prichard, "A Systemic Approach to Comparative
Law: Effect of Cost, Fee, and Financing Rules on the Development of Substantive Law" (1988) 17
J. Leg. Stud. 451.
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the case for reform is focused on products dangerously departing from
intended specifications, stronger arguments exist in favour of developing
the law of products liability along the lines discussed herein.
In my view, there are four principal arguments in favour of
reform.13 4 The first concerns the unfairness of the burden of proof
currently imposed on plaintiffs. Once a manufacturing defect is shown
on a balance of probabilities, is it fair to ask the plaintiff to explain in
negligence terms how this defect came about? When a product's
intended specifications are challenged, as when a failure to warn or
design defect is claimed, the product itself usually provides enough
information to address the defect/negligence issue. The warnings and
designs adopted by the defendant and competitors are readily accessible
to plaintiffs through the marketplace. Manufacturing defects fall in a
different category. Consumers usually know little about a product's
manufacturing process and, for various reasons, this information is not
always accessible. However, even assuming a plaintiff knows exactly how
his or her defective product is usually made (i.e., what normally happens
within the plant's four walls), this would be insufficient in many cases to
establish the required negligence. As noted earlier, a manufacturing
defect is exceptional by nature, since most products conform to their
intended specifications. Proving negligence means showing that, at the
time this exception surfaced, the manufacturer made some unreasonable
choice contributing to the mishap. Information about a manufacturer's
normal process may be helpful in speculating about what probably went
wrong. For example, a defendant's poor inspection or testing process
often supports the argument that regardless of how the defect arose, it
ought to have been discovered prior to supply.'35 However, when faced
with state-of-the-art procedures or hidden defects, as is often the case in
this area, knowledge of the usual is of limited use in explaining the
unusual. Here, in order to show an unreasonable choice, a plaintiff must
in theory discover the exact point in time and space where the
manufacturing process failed and produced the unintended. This type of
information is unavailable to consumers. Unlike automobile accidents
and most misadventures leading to tort actions, manufacturing defects
crystallize in concealed environments, inaccessible to their future
134 In this section, I attempt to link the policy arguments for strict liability to the specific
category of manufacturing defects. Similar arguments, of a more general tone, may be found in the
works of Waddams and Linden, supra notes 3 and 4; and in the Report on Products Liability, supra
note 6. See also notes 48-55 and accompanying text; Escola, supra note 46; and "The Assault on the
Citadel," supra note 15.
135 See, for example, MacPherson, supra note 27.
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victims. Indeed, the only witnesses to the manufacturing process and
potential negligence are the defendant manufacturer, its employees,
agents, and guests. Moreover, there usually is a lapse of time between
the alleged negligence (which must occur prior to supply) and the
damages suffered by the plaintiff. For example, the consumer in
Greenman13 6 was injured two years after purchasing the defendant's
combination power tool. Of course, the greater this time differential, the
more difficult it is for an outsider to explain what occurred during the
manufacturing process, even assuming he or she could pierce the
defendant's veil. In contrast, a rule of strict liability for manufacturing
defects would be fair to plaintiffs because it would tailor the required
elements to the type of information consumers might reasonably be
expected to have about products. The burden of proof would be limited
to a demonstration of the product's current condition and of its impact
on their person or property, but would not require an explanation of this
result. Under this theory, a plaintiff would have a prima facie cause of
action upon demonstrating the following elements: (1) at the time of the
accident, the unit used was dangerously different from others
manufactured according to specifications (defect); (2) the defendant was
responsible for the supply of this defective product (identity); and (3) the
defect caused personal injury or property damage (damage and
causation).
Another argument for strict liability focuses on the superficiality
of the common law in this area. Canadian courts have not been
insensitive to the hurdles facing consumers in accessing the information
required to establish negligence in the manufacturing process. As
discussed in Part II, evidential devices are commonly used to bridge the
gap between defect and unreasonable care. A popular device in Canada,
as confirmed by the recent appellate decisions discussed under Part V,
below, is the "general inference of negligence" derived from Grant.
137
Manufacturing defects, especially those involving the presence of foreign
elements in food and beverages, sometimes offer a sufficient indication
of their origins to support an inference that the defendant made an
unreasonable choice at some point in processing its products. In
addition, manufacturers have greater access to information relevant to
choices made in the usual course of their business (e.g., the inspection
and testing processes adopted), and to choices exceptional in nature
(e.g., human and mechanical mistakes). In light of this, it seems both fair
136 Supra note 48.
13 7 Supra note 40.
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and useful to equate a manufacturing defect with negligence, unless an
explanation is provided by the defendant compatible with lack of fault;
fair, because this device allows a consumer to overcome overwhelming
evidential obstacles towards recovery, and useful, because it poses the
question to the party best suited to provide an answer. While this
approach is commendable, and surely imperative in the absence of an
alternative standard of liability, it begets uncertainty and fails to address,
in an open fashion, the real concern raised by manufacturing defects:
which party, between an innocent consumer and the manufacturer of a
product dangerously different from its intended specifications, should
support the costs of personal injury and property damage associated with
the product's presence in the marketplace? Instead of offering cleat and
convincing reasons why a defendant manufacturer ought to be liable for
manufacturing defects, courts superficially fall back on the notion that
liability is justified only when an unreasonable choice is present. Yet
they ignore this very issue by inferring almost mechanically negligence
from defect. The difficulty is that it is unclear in what circumstances a
general inference of negligence or another device may be used and what
sort of evidence is required to rebut this presumption. As demonstrated
by Farro38 and LeBlanc,139 discussed under Part V, below, the mere
presence of a manufacturing defect appears to raise a presumption of
negligence and traditional evidence of reasonable care is often ignored.
Moreover, in many cases the defendant is in no better position than the
plaintiff to offer an explanation for the defective product, beyond
pointing to its current inspection and verification systems. The reason
for this inability is simple: manufacturing defects are exceptional and
cannot adequately be explained unless their exact sources in time and
space are determined. Access to information alone does not always
permit a manufacturer to overcome this evidential hurdle, intrinsic to the
very nature of this type of defect.
By resorting to inferences of negligence despite these difficulties,
the common law in this field is, in essence, moving towards recognizing
that the act of supplying a product containing a manufacturing defect, in
and of itself, constitutes negligence. In other words, the unreasonable
choice at the source of the plaintiffs losses is supply. Such a hypothesis
is defensible when a manufacturer has actual knowledge that one of its
products dangerously departs from its intended specifications, but
nonetheless allows that product to enter the market. However, absent
1 3 8 Supra note 17.
139 Supra note 18.
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such clear knowledge, equating supply with negligence suggests that a
reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have supplied
any products, as this is the only way to prevent an unintended departure
from specifications to enter the market. The problem with this
development is obvious: it labels as unreasonable a choice that will
continue to be made, without any modification, as manufacturers are in
the business of supplying products. A finding that supply, without more,
is negligent thus frustrates one of the traditional aims of the law of
negligence. It allows a plaintiff to receive compensation for injuries, but
it offers no guidance whatsoever to the defendant and to others as to
what conduct ought to have been avoided. In the end, an observer is left
with the impression that the concept of negligence is but an empty shell
in this area of the law. Courts usually decide it is just to transfer losses
caused by manufacturing defects to manufacturers, but their reasons
have little to do with lack of reasonable care in the supply of
manufacturers' products. In contrast, a rule of strict liability for
manufacturing defects forces a court to address directly whether a
person who supplies a product that is dangerously different from what
that person intended to supply ought to bear the social costs of this
product's presence in the market. There may be valid reasons for
answering this question in the negative, as discussed under Part V,
below, but it should be openly recognized that reasonable care in
preventing the injurious outcome is not on this list, neither in theory nor
in practice.
The third argument centres on the overall function of the law of
torts-to manage and control, as fairly and efficiently as reasonably
possible, the personal and social costs of injury and property damage.
There is debate in jurisprudence and, most notably, in academic
literature with respect to how this role is currently performed, and as to
how it should be performed if reform is needed.140 For instance, is the
overriding objective (and if not, should it be) to compensate victims for
their losses, to prevent future accidenis from occurring, to deter only
those accidents which are inefficient in economic terms, to spread the
social costs of dangerous activities amongst the people who benefit from
them, or simply to apply a set of principles to determine who, in justice,
should support a given loss? While there is little consensus on
implementation, it seems relatively clear that the general purpose of our
law of torts is to deal with accidents in a fair and (somehow) useful
140 A useful review of this debate may be found in P. Legrand, Jr., "Le droit des d6lits civils:
pour quoi faire?" in P. Legrand, Jr., ed., Common law d'un sikcle l'autre (Cowansville, Qu6.: Yvon
Blais, 1992) 449.
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manner. Although the current standard of liability for manufacturing
defects is compatible with this function, a rule of strict liability would
arguably represent an improvement to the status quo both in terms of
fairness and of social utility. The hypothesis here is twofold. By
officially removing the requirement for proof of negligence, the potential
of damages as a mechanism for redress would be significantly increased
and manufacturers, as a group, would be more exposed to liability than is
currently the case. The reasons for this probable change are the
following: (1) the requirement of fault extends the litigation process
causing delays, expenses, appeals, and disincentives to bring actions;
(2) the evidential shortcuts discussed earlier are not always available to
plaintiffs; 141 and (3) it ultimately remains possible for defendants to
escape liability by proving that they took all reasonable care in the
circumstances to prevent their products from being dangerously different
from their intended specifications. 42 If damages and civil liability do
indeed become more prevalent under a rule of strict liability, as they
should in theory, the dividends would be numerous. First, a fairer
treatment of consumers, not only because they would be relieved of a
difficult burden of proof, but because a greater number of them would
have access to the justice system. Second, a reduction in the transaction
costs involved in litigating manufacturer fault. The appeals discussed
under Part V, below, centre almost exclusively on the issue of negligence
and, in particular, on how an appellate court should reconcile a
theoretical requirement of fault with an obvious lack of evidence. The
costs involved in litigating whether a product contains a manufacturing
defect, whether the defendant is responsible for its supply, and whether
the defect caused the plaintiffs damages, are already incurred under the
present standard of fault. Third, there would be an improved
distribution of the costs associated with dangerous products. The
presence of consumer products in the market is beneficial to society as a
whole, both directly and indirectly: products offer for consumption the
results of manufacturer investment and innovation, and they ensure
income to thousands of individuals and businesses. Society should bear
part of the costs of personal injury and property damage resulting from
141 A general inference of negligence and res ipsa loquitur arguably applies only against the
manufacturer and not the wholesaler, repairer, or retailer who has less control of the product and its
instrumentalities. Moreover, where the defect is caused by a component part manufactured by
someone other than the defendant manufacturer, it is more difficult to infer negligence against the
latter.
142 For instance, by arguing that state-of-the-art methods of construction, inspection, and
testing were used at all relevant times.
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manufacturing defects. A rule of strict liability, imposing the full costs of
these defects on those who are in the business of supply (not only the
costs associated with actionable negligence), acts as a better conduit for
distribution because it causes the prices charged by this group to reflect
the full costs of manufacturing defects. This encourages not only loss
spreading, but also accident prevention since consumers would be
attracted by presumably safer (because they are cheaper) products. Of
course, if our only goal were distribution, a better conduit could be
adopted such as a general scheme of no-fault compensation funded by
taxes. However, besides the forfeiture of individual responsibility and a
likely increase in administrative costs associated with such a scheme, the
mere existence of a legislative option should not preclude the judiciary
from making incremental improvements to the common law, especially
when these changes further other, equally important objectives. A
fourth possible benefit would be increased manufacturer investment in
product safety. Some manufacturing defects cannot be avoided by the
exercise of reasonable care. For example, a percentage of beer bottles
manufactured in Canada will shatter for no apparent reason, despite the
use of state-of-the-art equipment to test bottles and detect flaws. By
focusing on reasonable care, our current rule fails to place incentives on
manufacturers to go beyond what is usually done in the market and to
decrease the number of unexplainable departures from specifications.
Increased exposure to liability under the proposed rule would arguably
fill this gap in deterrence. The fifth benefit would be a confirmation of a
manufacturer's ultimate responsibility for the safety of products placed
on the market. Assuming that some manufacturing defects are
inevitable (i.e., cannot be prevented short of ceasing supply), who should
support the costs of personal injury and property damage associated with
their use? A standard of negligence attributes these costs to innocent
victims. Arguably, however, such losses should fall on the persons who,
for their own purposes, create the risk by releasing their products in the
market. This proposition is simply the corollary to the rule of strict
liability derived from Rylands143 : a manufacturer would be liable for
supplying (instead of bringing on its land) a dangerous object. The
notion of "escape" inherent to the rule of Rylands is supplied here by the
fact that a manufacturing defect is dangerously different from its
intended design; that is, in both cases, the object's dangerousness is
linked to a departure from the defendant's control. The point is not that
manufacturers are at fault, but that they should be assessed for the costs,
currently imposed on society, of their pursuit of potentially dangerous
143 Supra note 104.
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activities. And sixth, there would be a confirmation that manufacturers,
as a class, are cheaper insurers than consumers. This proposition is
based on two facts: (1) manufacturers have more information about their
potential exposure for manufacturing defects with any given line of
products (i.e., about the number of units that will exceptionally depart
from specifications), than consumers have about their chances of
suffering personal injury or property damage by using a given product;
and (2) manufacturers have, at their disposal, an accessible and
competitive liability insurance market, whereas first-party consumer
coverage is still exceptional.
The fourth argument in favour of strict liability for
manufacturing defects concerns the reliance currently placed on
manufacturers. Without embarking on a stale debate as to whether
manufacturers create a demand for their products or simply respond to
one, the presence of their products in the market (especially when
accompanied by publicity) arguably gives rise to a special relationship of
confidence between them and consumers-a relationship that, at
minimum, entitles the latter to expect to receive what the former intends
to supply. A very rough analogy may be made with fiduciary
relationships, the characteristics of which are said to be the following: (1)
the fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power; (2)
the fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to
affect the beneficiary's legal or practical interests; and (3) the beneficiary
is peculiarly vulnerable to (or at the mercy of) the fiduciary holding the
discretion or power.144 Manufacturers have scope for the exercise of
discretion in the making of their products. For instance, they must
choose designs and warnings and supervise the entire manufacturing
process. Their decisions are influenced by consumer demands,
customary practices, government regulations, and financial
considerations, but they remain ultimately discretionary since
manufacturers have the power to choose amongst many equally
permissible options during all stages, from conception to supply.
Furthermore, subject to regulations, manufacturers can unilaterally
exercise that discretion so as to affect consumers' personal interests. As
noted, the quantity and quality of information included with a product
enhances a consumer's personal autonomy by allowing him or her to
make an informed decision about whether, and how, to use a product.
Similarly, the care employed in designing and manufacturing a product is
vital to respecting the integrity of a consumer's physical and property
144 See, for example, Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99; Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International
Corona Resources Ltd, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574; and KM v. H.M., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6 at 63.
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interests. The choices made during the conception, construction,
marketing, and supply of consumer products will thus have a direct
impact on these vital interests. That manufacturers have the power to
unilaterally affect consumer interests is evident from Buchan,145 where,
without violating government regulations, a Canadian pharmaceutical
company chose to provide Canadian consumers with less information
about the serious side effects of its birth control pill than that provided
by its sister company located in the United States, which manufactured
an identical product. Finally, consumers as a class are peculiarly
vulnerable to or at the mercy of manufacturers with respect to the safety
of their products. True, inspection and research may, to some extent,
ensure that a product meets minimum safety standards and personal
requirements-caveat emptor. In many instances, however, these tools
are simply incapable of discovering dangerous product defects. For
instance, manufacturing defects are usually hidden from a non-expert
eye, especially those involving malfunctioning component parts
integrated into the observable product. In these cases, reliance is the
only alternative to non-purchase. Manufacturers, whether in the
business of making pharmaceutical drugs or lawnmowers, are perceived
as experts in their respective fields. They are relied upon by the public to
keep up with the state of the art and to produce reasonably safe
products. This reliance is fed by a disparity in knowledge between these
two groups, but also by a disparity of opportunities for inspection and
testing, and where there is reliance there is a corresponding
vulnerability. This being said, it is arguable that a similar fiduciary
relationship exists between manufacturers and consumers, at least with
respect to the safety of the products supplied by the former, 46 and that
this relationship imposes a duty on the manufacturer to supply products
which do not dangerously depart from their intended specifications.
This duty is breached when a manufacturing defect materializes and
causes damage to person or property. Irrespective of this argument,
however, consumers clearly have the minimal (and reasonable)
expectation that they will not suffer personal injury or property damage
as a result of a product being dangerously different from what it was
supposed to be. A manufacturing defect represents a plain violation of
this confidence, regardless of whether an explanation consistent with
-lack of reasonable care can be given for this injurious outcome. The
manufacturer responsible for the product's presence in the market ought
145 Supra note 91.
146 As noted in Mclnerney v. MacDonald, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 138, relationships may be qualified
as fiduciary for some purposes, while not for others.
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to be similarly responsible for the costs imposed on others by said the
breach. By recognizing that supply of a defective product is insufficient
to sustain liability, the current rule fails to account for this notion of
reliance. The law of negligence fails to recognize that a breach has
occurred when a product departs dangerously from its intended
specifications-perhaps not a breach of a duty of care, but surely a
breach of the confidence fostered by the product's presence in the
market.
V. TWO MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
Farro147 and LeBlanc1 48 illustrate the type of products liability
action where our courts ought to recognize that lack of reasonable care is
unnecessary for liability in tort. Unfortunately, they also demonstrate
the extent to which the Canadian judiciary, while willing to dilute
concepts like negligence in order to avoid unjust results, adamantly
refuses to take the next logical step of adopting an alternative basis of
liability.
In LeBlanc, the plaintiff was severely injured when a beer bottle,
brewed by the defendant and manufactured by a third party (Consumer's
Packaging Inc.), unexpectedly shattered in his hand. The plaintiff was a
volunteer at a beer garden and was in the process of transferring bottled
beer into large containers, measuring two feet by four feet, when a bottle
he was pushing into the crushed ice and water, neck-first, made a "pooP"
sound. The bottle broke and the inside of the plaintiffs left hand was
badly cut. According to the trial judge, approximately 18 bottles out of a
potential of 48 were in the container at the time of the incident, thereby
eliminating blows with adjacent bottles or walls of the tub as the source
of the explosion. Further, there was no evidence of abuse, excessive
force, or mishandling of the bottle on the part of the plaintiff. The trial
judge dismissed the action against Consumer's Packaging Inc. because
there was no evidence to show that the bottle (a component part) was
defective when supplied by its manufacturer: "a defect could only be
inferred on speculation" and such inference could not be made "on
account of the numerous intervening factors which come into play in the
total bottling process by the defendant [brewer]." 149 The cause of the
147Supra note 17.
148 Supra note 18.
149 (1993), 130 N.B.R. (2d) 271 (Q.B.) at 279.
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explosion was a defect in the product supplied by the defendant, that is,
the bottled beer. Regarding the production process, evidence obtained
from witnesses demonstrated that, although rare, the explosion of bottles
does occur in the bottling process. At some point during the defendant's
manufacturing process, the product handled by the plaintiff became
particularly vulnerable to pressure and an unreasonable risk of
shattering was created. According to the trial judge, "the only
reasonable inference is that the defendant was negligent" with respect to
this defect °50 The plaintiff was awarded $21,666.03 in damages.
The defendant appealed the finding of negligence arguing, inter
alia, that it had a state-of-the-art inspection process for the detection of
defective bottles, that spending a greater amount of money in this
respect would undermine its competitiveness in the market, and that it
was not an insurer for the products it supplied. Relying on Grant1 51 and
a series of cases inferring negligence from a manufacturing defect of the
kind in issue,152 the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, per Rice J.A.,
arrived at the following conclusion: "[t]he trial judge made no error in
principle when he inferred that the appellant had been negligent in
allowing such a product to reach the hands of a consumer in the
circumstances." 153 Furthermore, the arguments that the appellant had
an inspection process comparable to that of other manufacturers and
that relatively few bottles explode in the manufacturing process are "not
relevant" according to the Court,154 even when based on economic
feasibility.
Compared to LeBlanc, the factual background of Farro is
somewhat less typical of products liability suits involving manufacturing
defects. While having their Toronto home renovated, the plaintiffs had a
ceiling exhaust fan installed in their bathroom. The fan was
manufactured by the defendant, Nutone Electrical Limited (Nutone).
The fan consisted of a number of components, including a motor
manufactured by another company (uPco) not involved in the action,
and installed into the final product by Nutone. The motor was
manufactured according to Nutone's specifications in compliance with
the standards set by the Canadian Standards Association (csA) and had
150 Ibid. at 277.
151 Supra note 40.
152 In particular, Cohen v. Coca-Cola Ltd., [1967] S.C.R. 469 at 473, where the Court
interpreted the presumption of negligence created by art. 1238 C.C.L.C..
1 5 3 Supra note 18 at 293-94 [emphasis added].
154 IbL at 294.
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been sold in large quantities without any previous problems. In
particular, the standard motor was equipped with a thermal fuse
designed to cut off power if the coil exceeded a predetermined
temperature. In May 1981, according to the trial judge's findings, the fan
motor overheated causing the copper windings of the motor coil and the
plastic grille to melt and drop onto the plastic toilet seat cover located
below the fan. This resulted in a fire which caused smoke damage to the
plaintiffs' house and its contents. After the fire, the fan was delivered by
the district fire chief to the CSA for inspection. The fan was ultimately
destroyed by a CSA employee before Nutone had an opportunity to
conduct its own examination, and before Nutone was notified that an
action for damages was being pursued by the plaintiffs.
The trial judge eliminated the human and other extraneous
causes of the fire suggested by the defendant and concluded, on the
balance of probabilities, that the fire was caused when the fan's motor
overheated. Sutherland J. noted that the case did not involve
"allegations of defective labelling" 155 and found that the plaintiffs failed
to establish any defect in the design of the fan or of its motor. The heat
build-up in the motor should have caused a properly operating thermal
fuse, of the kind stipulated in upco's design and approved by the CSA, to
cut off the power in time to avoid the melting of the coil and plastic
grille. This would have prevented the droppings of boiling copper and
plastic and thus would have prevented the fire. It is implicit in the trial
judge's reasons that the cause of the fire was the absence of a functional
thermal fuse in the plaintiffs fan-a manufacturing defect in the product
supplied by the defendant. However, the action against Nutone was
dismissed because the plaintiffs had failed to establish precisely how this
defect had occurred; that is, they had failed to show that negligence was
the reason for the failure of the thermal protection device. According to
the trial judge, explanations for this defect which spoke of negligence
were a failure to include said device, an improper installation, or an
installation despite some observable or latent defect. None of these
admittedly unreasonable choices was shown to have been made.
Interestingly, none of these choices could be attributed to the defendant
since the protective device is built into the coil of the motor
manufactured by uPco and there is no mWay for Nutone visually to take
cognizance of any manufacturing defect in this component part. The
case nonetheless proceeded, without objection, on the basis that Nutone
would be liable if the fan motor were shown or inferred to have been
negligently manufactured by upco.
155 [1988] O.J. No. 143 (QL).
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The Ontario Court of Appeal reversed the finding with respect to
liability. According to Lacourci~re J.A., writing for the Court, the issue
was whether a manufacturer can be liable for a defect in a component
part made by another company, integrated into the final product, where
the part is destroyed and is not available for testing. In principle, a
manufacturer's duty in the making of its products includes a duty to take
reasonable care in selecting, inspecting, handling, and assembling all of
the product's component parts. The fact that the defect in the motor was
not readily apparent to Nutone's naked eye was beside the point, since
Nutone accepted responsibility for the damage in the event that there
was negligence in the manufacture of the fan motor. The real issue was
whether the plaintiffs met their burden of proving negligence.
According to Lacourci~re J.A., the plaintiffs established a prima facie
case of defect in the motor by showing that the fire originated in the
motor and that a properly functioning thermal protection device would
have prevented the fire. Further, the plaintiffs eliminated all possible
extraneous causes of the fire. Having made these findings, the trial judge
placed, according to the Court of Appeal, "too heavy a burden on the
appellants to show how the particular defect occurred."15 6 The plaintiffs
do not have to advance direct evidence that a defect existed when the
component part left upco's plant, as this would be an impossible burden.
They can meet their burden by demonstrating circumstantially that the
defect must have been there when the product left the plant, for
instance, by showing how improbable it was that some other person was
responsible for the hazard after the product left the manufacturer.
There was "ample evidence of sufficient weight and cogency to
warrant the inference that, on a balance of probabilities, the supplier of
the respondent was negligent in omitting to install or improperly
installing a defective thermal protection device.1157 In addition, the
Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in attributing fault for the
destruction of the fan after the fire to the plaintiffs, since this destruction
was not due to any action of the plaintiffs. The fact that Nutone did not
have the opportunity to inspect the fan after the fire should not destroy
the plaintiffs claim. Similarly, the argument that the defendant's
supplier was deprived of the opportunity of proving that it had properly
installed a visibly functioning thermal protection device in the plaintiffs'
home was speculative, unsupported by the evidence, and, in any event,
irrelevant. Cautioned Lacourci~re J.A., "to give effect to such a
156 Supra note 17 at 642 [emphasis in original].
1571bid. at 642 [emphasis added].
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speculative defence would undermine the progressive line of cases which
placed liability on the manufacturer of a defective product; this is so
even in the case of a latent defect if the manufacturer failed to rebut the
onus on it to disprove negligence."158 The appeal was allowed and Nutone
was held liable for $60,000.
My first observation is that both cases clearly deal with
manufacturing defects. The plaintiff in LeBlanc did not challenge as
unreasonable the specifications adopted by either the defendant bottler
or by the manufacturer of the bottles in the making of their respective
products. Similarly, the plaintiff made no allegation that he should have
been warned of the risk of shattering when handling beer bottles. In
Farro, the plaintiffs did not rely on any failure to warn theory and their
argument that the fan's design was defective because it called for a "one-
shot" thermal device, instead of a more extensive device that could be
tested without destroying its usefulness, was summarily dismissed.
Liability in both cases centred on the manufacturers having supplied
products dangerously departing from their intended specifications, that
is, products containing a manufacturing defect. The beer bottles
supplied by Oland Breweries Ltd. do not normally explode when used in
a reasonable manner. It was proven that the unit handled by the plaintiff
shattered for no distinct reason and caused severe injury to his hand.
The plaintiff had proven, by a preponderance of evidence, that the unit
handled was different from similar products manufactured by the
defendant according to design, and that the difference rendered the
product dangerous to a consumer's person. Likewise, the ceiling exhaust
fans manufactured by Nutone are designed to include functional thermal
protection devices to prevent overheating of the motor. The trial judge
found that the fan purchased by the plaintiffs and supplied by the
defendant was dangerously different from said specifications, since the
unit's safety device did not properly function, causing serious smoke
damage. Accordingly, at the core of both LeBlanc and Farro is a finding
of fact that losses suffered by the respective plaintiffs were directly
attributable to a manufacturing defect contained in the product supplied
by the defendant manufacturers.
The appellate courts in both cases seem to equate these findings
of defect (injurious outcomes) with corresponding findings of negligence
(unreasonable choices). In keeping with principle, they insinuate that
158 ibUL at 644 [emphasis added].
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liability in tort is not strict but based on negligence! 59 However, they
then pay little attention to the possible explanations for the defects and
the care employed by the defendants in supplying their respective
products. The courts at both levels in LeBlanc effectively overlook why
the unit handled by the plaintiff was vulnerable to shattering and, in
particular, whether the reason is linked to some unreasonable choice
made by the manufacturer or one of its employees. Further, the New
Brunswick Court of Appeal notes that the state of the art in the industry
with respect to inspection, the low probability and unpredictability of
supplying defective bottles, and the feasibility of added measures of
prevention-three factors often considered in judging the
reasonableness of a defendant's conduct in a non-products liability
negligence action 16°-are "not relevant" in determining the
manufacturer's liability. In Farro, as noted, the Court of Appeal goes so
far as to criticize the trial judge for placing much emphasis on "how the
particular defect occurred," the very focus of a negligence inquiry.
Indeed, the trial judge was on solid ground in requiring evidence of this
sort since negligence, as distinct from strict liability, is concerned with
unreasonable choices and not simply unacceptable results. If the burden
of proof with respect to negligence means anything, it means that a
plaintiff must satisfy a trier of fact that it is more likely than not that a
defendant made some unreasonable choice in allowing a defective
product to be supplied to consumers. In both LeBlanc and Farro, the
evidence adduced by the plaintiffs is directed solely at the existence of a
defect, that is, at showing that the products were different from their
manufacturer's specifications. No attempt is made by the plaintiffs to
explain the flaw in the product and to ground their explanation in lack of
reasonable care on the part of the defendant-to show that the
defendants should have done something different in the circumstances.
In essence, the appellate courts simply substitute a judgment of
159 In LeBlanc, supra notes 18 and 149, the courts at both levels are silent on the impact of
section 27 of the Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. C-18.1, which adopts
a standard of strict liability under certain circumstances. They proceed on the footing that proof of
negligence is required in order to secure recovery. In Farro, supra note 155, the trial judge noted:
"[a]lthough much has been said about how close the law of Ontario has come to strict liability in
products liability cases, our law has not taken the final step. Formally, the liability of a
manufacturer depends upon a finding that he was negligent." In the appeal, Lacourcinre J.A.
observed, supra note 17 at 643, that the "trial judge's reasons contain a careful review of the facts
and an appropriate distinction between the negligence standard applicable in this case and the
standard of strict liability."




negligence for a finding of defect in the manufacture of bottled beer and
ceiling fans.
In fairness, this leap from defect to negligence is not without
principle. As noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal, a plaintiff is never
required to prove his or her case exclusively with direct evidence.
Circumstantial evidence, such as proof of a manufacturing defect in the
defendant's product, may offer a solid ground for inferring lack of
reasonable care on the part of the defendant manufacturer. That a
manufacturer supplies a product dangerously departing from others
made according to specifications does speak, at least to some extent, of
negligence in the making of its products. In such a case, the argument
proceeds, a failure of some sort probably occurred during the
defendant's manufacturing process because if employees, machinery, and
inspection and testing mechanisms performed according to norm at all
times, the product used by the plaintiff would probably have been what it
was supposed to be. Thus, absent a showing that someone other than
the defendant is responsible for the defect, as was shown by the bottle
manufacturer in LeBlanc, it seems reasonable to infer negligence from
proof of defect. The appellate courts of New Brunswick and Ontario
resort to this evidential device in order to overcome the weakness in the
plaintiffs' cases with respect to negligence and, in so doing, follow a line
of cases alluded to earlier when discussing res ipsa loquitur and similar
devices. 161 Furthermore, as recognized by Lacourci6re J.A. in Farro,
there are policy reasons supporting such an inference of manufacturer
negligence, in particular, the relatively shaky position of the plaintiff in
accessing the information required to establish lack of reasonable care.
Having said this, it is evident from the reasons given in both cases
that the appellate courts have little genuine concern for discovering
whether the defects in issue were the result of negligence. I say this for
many reasons. First, although they clearly denote different concepts,
the courts use ,the terms "defect" and "negligence" interchangeably
throughout their opinions, hinting that proof of the former is proof of
the latter, and not merely a ground supporting a general inference.
Second, the task of disproving negligence placed on the defendant
manufacturers as a result of the inferences of negligence is not
significantly easier than the reverse task placed on the plaintiffs. While a
manufacturer does have greater access to information relating to
occurrences inside its plant, the likelihood of it being able to provide any
explanation of why a particular unit is dangerously different from its
intended design, let alone an explanation refuting negligence in this
161 Supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
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respect, seems somewhat remote.162 In my respectful opinion, the courts
in LeBlanc and Farro are motivated less by a concern of placing the
burden of proof on the party best able to provide answers, than by a
concern of allocating losses associated with unexplainable dangers, such
as manufacturing defects in bottled beer and ceiling fans.
Third, in determining whether there was any evidence opposed
to an inference of negligence, the courts in both cases disregard factors
traditionally considered (if not always given a determining role) in
judging the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct. The New
Brunswick Court of Appeal finds that the state of the art in the bottling
industry with respect to inspection, infrequency, and unpredictability of
explosions and the costs of additional measures of prevention are "not
relevant" to the issue of negligence. The Ontario Court of Appeal
criticizes the trial judge for asking "how" the manufacturing defect
occurred, although the reason for a mishap is the very core of any
negligence inquiry, and makes no comment about the significance of the
fact that it was "impossible for [the defendant] to visually inspect each
device to ensure that it was free of observable defects"1 63 since the
thermal protection device is built into the coil of the motor by the motor
manufacturer uIco. In addition, it was impossible for Nutone to test the
"one-shot" protection devices without destroying their validity. Thus,
although there was very little, if anything, that Nutone could have done
differently in the circumstances to avoid the manufacturing defect, it was
held responsible in negligence for the plaintiffs' losses. True, the trial
judge noted that Nutone had not "denied responsibility in the event that
it is found that there was negligence in the manufacture of the motor."1 64
However, considering the irrelevance of conventional vicarious liability,
the view shared by both levels of court that strict liability was
inapplicable, the way in which the Court formulated the duty of a
manufacturer with respect to its products' component parts,165 the
emphasis placed by Nutone on lack of evidence showing negligence in
the making of the motor, and the general importance of the case, one
162 This is particularly evident in Farro, supra note 17, where, apart from the fact that the
ceiling fan was destroyed by a third party, the Court of Appeal effectively asks Nutone, the maker of
the fan, to disprove negligence in the manufacture of the motor, which was a component part made
by another company located in Chicago.
163 Ibi at 640.
164 Supra note 155.
165 Lacourci~re J.A. noted, supra note 17 at 640, that a "manufacturer has a duty to take
reasonable care in the manufacture of his product, including all its component parts, and failure to
take such reasonable care can result in liability to the ultimate user or consumer" [emphasis added].
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would expect the Court of Appeal to comment on the validity of the
defendant's apparent concession, if lack of reasonable care is really
central to recovery
66
Lastly, the conclusion in both cases suggests that the act of
supplying a product containing a manufacturing defect is, in itself,
negligent behaviour. In other words, regardless of the reasons why the
product is flawed, allowing it to enter the market denotes lack of
reasonable care on the part of the manufacturer; supply denotes an
unreasonable choice. This view is made very clear in LeBlanc-where
Rice J.A. agrees with the trial judge that Oland "had been negligent in
allowing such a [defective] product to reach the hands of a consumer,"
167
despite finding nothing wrong in the defendant's manufacturing
process-and it is implicit throughout the reasoning in Farro, especially
in the Court's ready acceptance of the manufacturer's concession.
However, there is a serious problem with equating supply with
negligence in this context. Manufacturing defects are, by definition,
unintended departures from a manufacturer's specifications.
Accordingly, when tort law finds a manufacturer negligent (I am not
speaking of liability here) for the mere act of supplying a product
containing such a defect, regardless of whether or not someone or
something misbehaved at an earlier stage, it is recognizing a norm of
conduct impossible to be complied with. It is finding unreasonable a
choice that must and will be made by manufacturers in order to stay in
business-the choice of allowing goods to enter the market. Of course,
manufacturing defects are foreseeable and this is why a duty of care in
the making of products has been recognized ever since Donoghue.16 3
However, negligence goes beyond causing the materialization of a
foreseeable result. Negligence is about exercising lack of reasonable
care in allowing a foreseeable result to transpire. It is about doing what
a reasonable person would not have done in the circumstances, or failing
to do what a reasonable person would have done.1 69 The law of
negligence should accordingly disclose the choices that are unreasonable,
and thus open to liability, so that interested parties may plan their
behaviour accordingly; it should (and usually does) tell defendants what
166 The validity of concessions on important legal issues is often the subject of comment in
appellate courts: see, for example, R. v. Cognos Inc., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87 at 115-16; and Canson
Enterptises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534 at 570.
167 Supra note 18 at 293-94.
16 8 Supra note 2.
169 Arland v. Taylor, [1955] O.R. 131 (C.A.).
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should have been done differently in stated circumstances. Since a
manufacturing defect is unintended and presumably unknown,170 a
finding of negligence based solely on the product's supply is tantamount
to saying that the manufacturer should not have supplied the product at
all, or that a reasonable manufacturer would have made another choice
in the circumstances-the choice of not allowing any of its products to
enter the market.
These observations do not suggest that the defendants in
LeBlanc and Farro should have escaped liability. In my view, the result
in both cases is manifestlyjust. Rather, the point is that liability should
have been based on something other than fault. The manufacturers held
responsible each supplied, as a matter of fact, a product dangerously
departing from its intended design. As a result of the presence of this
product in the market, the plaintiffs suffered personal injury (Mr.
LeBlanc) and damage to property (the Farros). The probable cause of
each loss was the manufacturing defect, the courts having rejected all
other possible causes including contributory negligence. As shown, the
appellate courts were much more concerned with the presence or
absence of such injurious manufacturing outcomes than with choices
made throughout the defendants' respective processes that explain these
results. This is an appropriate concern. For reasons already given,
manufacturing defects are intolerable outcomes in today's society and
liability should follow the party (or parties) responsible for causing them
regardless of whether an explanation couched in negligence vocabulary
can be given. Unfortunately, the appellate courts of New Brunswick and
Ontario did not seize these perfect opportunities for openly recognizing
what they, and other courts in Canada, have been doing for years in like
situations. They failed to make the incremental change to the common
law, discussed under Part IV, above, that would ground liability in results
rather than choices. Although the holdings in LeBlanc and Farro are
commendable, the opinions given prevent the energy presently spent on
the negligence element from being diverted to better purposes, and fail
to clarify an area of law that has become increasingly rhetorical.
170 Of course, the situation is different when the manufacturer knows that a particular unit is
defective. In such a case, a finding of negligence means that the defendant was negligent in allowing
the product to reach consumers.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Much has been said about the pertinence of negligence as a basis
for liability in Canadian products liability law. In view of the continuing
apathy of our provincial legislatures and courts with respect to this issue,
and in light of recent developments in the United States where many
jurisdictions struggle with the implementation of a general standard of
strict liability, this author felt that at least three points could be added to
the Canadian debate. First, irrespective of the sound policy arguments
favouring a stricter judicial attitude towards manufacturers in tort, pure
strict liability appears unworkable in many circumstances. This is so, for
instance, when a plaintiff challenges as defective a product design
adopted by the defendant manufacturer or the safety information
provided by the latter. Since these arguments by definition centre on a
choice made by the manufacturer in the supply of its products, they
inevitably invite considerations traditionally associated with the law of
negligence into their respective analysis of liability, such as cost-benefit
weighing and foreseeability of risk. In contrast, when a plaintiff claims
that the product unit causing his or her loss is dangerously different from
other products manufactured by the defendant according to its own
specifications (i.e., when the claim is based on a manufacturing defect),
the theory centres on a result and it is possible, if desired, to assign
liability regardless of the explanation given for this outcome.
Second, not only is it possible, but it is preferable to disregard the
reasonable care exercised by a manufacturer in determining its
responsibility for supplying a product containing a manufacturing defect.
A prima facie case for manufacturer liability ought to exist when a
plaintiff demonstrates, on a balance of probabilities: (1) that a product is
dangerously different from its intended design; (2) that the defendant is
responsible for the defective product's supply; and (3) that recognized
damages were caused by this defect. In defence, a manufacturer could
perhaps argue that someone else is responsible for the manufacturing
defect or that the plaintiff somehow contributed to his or her damages,
but reasonable care in preventing this defect ought to be considered
immaterial. This principle of strict liability in tort would demand from
plaintiff's information that is reasonably accessible to them, it would
force a court to address candidly the question of who should bear the
costs of unexplainable manufacturing defects, it would represent an
improvement to the status quo in terms of fairness and social utility, and
it would stress that consumer reliance is fundamentally breached
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whenever a product is dangerously different from what it was supposed
to be.
And lastly, legislative intervention is not necessary in order for
this principle to be recognized. As was recently confirmed by the
Supreme Court of Canada, courts have both the power and the duty to
make incremental changes to the common law to see that it develops in a
manner consistent with modern notions of commercial reality and
justice. Strict liability for manufacturing defects represents such a
development. It is incremental because it is limited to a very specific
area of products liability, where courts currently invoke evidential
devices such as general inferences of negligence and res ipsa loquitur in
order to fill the gap between defect and unreasonable care. It is required
because, compared to the current rule, it is open, fairer, more useful, and
indicative of the very special relationship that exists between
manufacturers and the consumers of their products. In keeping with
their power and duty to ensure the incremental evolution of the common
law, our courts should openly recognize a standard of strict tort liability
when faced with litigation involving manufacturing defects. When a
plaintiff suffers personal injury or damage to property because of a
product dangerously departing from its intended design, liability should
be determined, not by asking whether the choices made in leading to this
result are reasonable in the circumstances, but by asking who caused this
intolerable outcome.
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